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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the dynamic macroeconomic eects of immigration. Chapter 1 pro-
vides an overview of this thesis.
Chapter 2 empirically examines the eects of immigration by interpreting shocks to
unanticipated changes in working population as immigration shocks and identifying the
shocks using a VAR with sign restriction. We nd that immigration shocks are not
associated with rises in non-residential investment or short-run reductions in average
wages. We also show how a neoclassical growth model with a CES production function
where migrant labor and capital are complements to skilled domestic labor and substitutes
to each other can produce responses closer to those in the VAR.
Chapter 3 examines theoretically the macroeconomic eects of immigration on labor
market outcomes, especially labor share, for alternative assumptions on the bargaining
power of workers using a New Keynesian model with labor market frictions and hetero-
geneous unemployed workers. Unemployed workers are heterogeneous in the sense that
some of them are short-term unemployed (insiders), the others are long-term unemployed
(outsiders). We nd that, when immigrants enter as outsiders and reduce the bargaining
power of workers, labor share of national income shows a hump-shaped decline, which is
in line with empirical evidence by a VAR analysis.
Chapter 4 analyzes theoretically the macroeconomic impacts of a policy of increasing
immigration in response to an unexpected increase in its debt to GDP ratio. We nd
that there is indeed a potential for a policy to boost economic activity of increased debt
without increasing the present value of budget decits if the expected tax revenue from
future increased population growth is spent eectively on productive public capital at the
correct time.
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Chapter 1
Overview of Thesis
This thesis consists of three essays that analyze the dynamic macroeconomic eects of
immigration. In spite of there being a large literature on the microeconomic impacts of
immigration, the studies on the macroeconomic eects of immigration are sparse. This
should come as a surprise, considering current active debates on immigration policy in
advanced countries. The following three chapters attempt to ll this gap and contribute
to our better understanding of the macroeconomic implications of immigration.
As a framework for the analysis of macroeconomic impacts of immigration, we rely on a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model throughout this thesis. Nowadays,
medium-scaled DSGE models have become central tools for macroeconomic analysis in
central banks and policy institutions.1 The DSGE models have the strength that they are
not exposed to the Lucas critique, since individual behavior is derived from intertemporal
optimization problems by forward-looking agents who have rational expectations. The
fully microfounded nature also enables us to conduct welfare analysis.
Furthermore, the increased popularity of DSGE models lies in their ability of incor-
1For example, the IMF's DSGE model, \GIMF", is described in Kumhof et al. (2010). The DSGE
model used at FRB of New York, \FRBNY DSGE model", is presented in Del Negro et al. (2013).
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porating many features and structural shocks, and its usefulness for forecasting. See
seminal works by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), and Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2007). This thesis introduces immigration shocks into DSGE models and analyzes
its implications. In Chapter 2, we regard immigration as a shock to working population
using a stochastic neoclassical growth model. In Chapter 4, we introduce immigration
and public capital into a neoclassical growth model with distortionary taxes in order to
look at the dynamic eects of immigration on debt dynamics, investment and growth.
Recent studies incorporate Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides type of labor market fric-
tions (Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) into an otherwise a standard New
Keynesian (NK) DSGE models.2 In line with this strand of research, Chapter 3 looks at
the dynamic macroeconomics eects of immigration on labor market dynamics such as
labor income share and unemployment in a NK model with search and matching frictions
in the labor market.
Helpful insights for the state of the art macroeconomics were also gained outside Royal
Holloway. For DSGE models with search, I owe a lot to the lectures series given at London
School of Economics in 2013 by Professor Robert Shimer of University of Chicago. For NK
DSGE models, I developed a deeper intuition from lecture series by Professor Lawrence
Christiano of Northwestern University, given at the International Monetary Fund in 2014
where I worked as a summer intern.
In the following, I briey summarize the content and results of each chapter.
2Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) are the rst to introduce search frictions into a standard RBC
model.
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1.1 Identifying Immigration Shocks
Chapter 2, coauthored with Andrew Mountford, provides the empirical evidence on the
impact of shocks to immigration on macroeconomy. Standard macroeconomic theory
predicts that unexpected increases in the population should lead to increases in investment
per capita so that the capital stock returns to its balanced growth path capital-to-labor
ratio. In Chapter 2, we show, using vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, that such a
relationship is not found in the post war U.S. data.
One feature of the empirical analysis is that it takes account of the fact that the work-
ing population diers from other macroeconomic variables in that much of its movement
can be predicted years ahead since records of birth and mortality rates are publicly avail-
able. Thus, a large proportion of the changes in the working population (aged 16-64) can
be anticipated 16 years ahead of time. We therefore correct for such anticipated changes
in working population and nd that unanticipated changes in the working population
corresponds closely with immigration levels. We then interpret shocks to unanticipated
changes in working population as immigration shocks and identify immigration shocks
using a VAR with sign restriction, following Uhlig (2005), and Mountford and Uhlig
(2009). We nd that immigration shocks are not associated with rises in non-residential
investment, or short-run reductions in average wages. We also show how a neoclassical
growth model with CES production function where (unskilled) migrant labor and capital
are complements to skilled domestic labor and substitutes each other can replicate the
responses obtained from VARs.
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1.2 Eects of Immigration Shocks on Labor Market Dy-
namics
Motivated by the empirical evidence found in Chapter 2 that labor share does decline
in response to an immigration shock, as well as the observation that the United States
experienced the decline of the labor share over the las three decades, Chapter 3 theoreti-
cally examines the macroeconomic eects of immigration on labor share. An increase in
the ability of immigrant labor may reduce the bargaining power of workers and therefore
reduce labor share.
In Chapter 3, we use a model of Bruckner and Pappa (2012), which is a New Key-
nesian model with labor market frictions and heterogeneous unemployed workers. The
presence of search frictions allow us to analyze the bargaining power of workers and un-
employment. Unemployed workers are heterogeneous in the sense that one is short-term
unemployed (insiders), the other is long-term unemployed (outsiders). This heterogeneity
in unemployed workers may well be helpful in discussing the impact of immigration on
the macroeconomy since immigration could be thought of as an exogenous shock to the
numbers of outsiders.
We nd that, when immigrants enter as outsiders and reduce the bargaining power
of workers, labor share of national income shows a hump-shaped decline, which is in line
with empirical evidence by a VAR analysis. This suggests that the importance of the role
of the worker's bargaining power in investigating the dynamic macroeconomic impacts of
immigration, to which no role is given in the standard New Keynesian model. We also
consider alternative scenarios where immigrants arrives as employed workers or insiders
and nd that immigration adversely eects, or directly competes with, the sector they
16
enter, but benets other sector(s).
1.3 Eects of Immigration Shocks on Debt Dynamics
Recently, Ben-Gad (2012) has shown how immigration creates an incentive for current
native population to support higher decits because the cost of nancing them can be par-
tially shifted to future immigrants. In Chapter 4, we reverse his argument and investigate
whether government decits create an incentive to admit more immigrants.
We theoretically analyze the macroeconomic eects of immigration in response to
an unexpected increase in its debt to GDP ratio. It is intuitive that an increase in
immigration will reduce the rate of debt per capita and the debt to GDP ratio, ceteris
paribus, since the number of taxpayers increases. However, an increase in immigration will
also reduce the domestic private capitals per person if other things are equal. This is what
is called a \capital dilution eect". This capital dilution eect may cause a slowdown in
the growth of GDP per capita, which in turn potentially may lead to a rise in the level
of debt.
In Chapter 4, we extend the model of Uhlig (2010) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) to
allow for immigration and public capital in order to examine the macroeconomic impacts
of immigration shocks in response to an unexpected increase in its debt to GDP ratio. We
nd that there is indeed a potential for such a policy to boost economic activity without
increasing the present value of government debts if the expected tax revenue from future
increased population growth is spent eectively on productive public capital at the correct
time. However, there is also scope for depressing the economy further if the dilution of the
domestic capital stock by increased population is not properly managed. For example,
the direct government investment in private capital or less productive public capital is
17
not useful in mitigating capital dilution.
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Chapter 2
The Macroeconomics of
Immigration
2.1 Introduction
While there have been a lot of recent studies on the microeconomic impacts of immi-
gration there has been less attention focused on the implications of immigration for the
macroeconomy. According to U.S. Census Bureau and Current Population Survey (CPS)
data, immigration has been a signicant part of the U.S. population growth over recent
decades. In 1970 about 9.6 million (4:7%) of the U.S. total population was foreign born
to non-U.S. nationals, by 2010 this number had risen to nearly 40 million or 12:9% of the
U.S. total population. In this paper we examine the eect of shocks to working population
on the macroeconomy using the techniques of macroeconomic time series analysis. The
analysis shows that, consistent with the standard neoclassical growth model, GDP per
capita and consumption per capita temporarily fall in response to a positive shock to the
This is joint work with Andrew Mountford, who performed an empirical analysis.
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working population. However, non-residential investment per capita does not rise and
real wages do not fall in the short run following an unexpected increase in the working
population and as would also be predicted by the standard growth model.
The paper shows that a neoclassical growth model with a constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) production function where migrant labor is a substitute for capital but
a complement to skilled domestic labor can produces responses to an immigration shock
much closer to those of the VAR. In particular, it can produce responses where investment
falls in response to an immigration shock and where the wage response of most agents
is initially positive due to the complementarity of immigrant labor with most domestic
labor. Thus, the VAR results and the macroeconomic growth model both lend support
to the ndings of the microeconomic literature that immigrant labor is a much closer
substitute for native unskilled labor than native skilled labor. See e.g., Ottaviano and
Peri (2012) for the U.S. economy, Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) for the
U.K. economy, and Ortega and Verdugo (2014) for the French economy.
One feature of the empirical analysis is that it takes account of the fact that increases
in the working population dier from other macroeconomic variables in that much of its
movement can be predicted years ahead. Birth and mortality data are publicly available
and so a large proportion of the changes in the working population can be anticipated 16
years ahead of time. As the work of Ramey (2011a) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) detail, correcting for anticipated changes in the variables of a VAR is necessary
to remove potential biases from the analysis. We therefore correct for such anticipated
changes in population in the data and nd, very intuitively, that unanticipated changes
in the working population correspond quite closely with immigration levels. We there-
fore interpret shocks to unanticipated changes in the working population as immigration
20
shocks.
The analysis and results of the paper are of interest for two distinct reasons. Firstly,
the key state variable in balanced growth models is the capital-labor ratio and while the
literature has paid a lot of attention to the determinants of individual labor supply,1 much
less attention has been given to the determinants of the size of the working population,
although see Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2012) for a notable exception. This paper at-
tempts to redress this imbalance by focusing on the macroeconomic eects of immigration
which is one of the key determinants of changes in the labor force. Secondly, there is a
large microeconomic literature on the eects of immigration on the labor market. One
of the key puzzles of this literature was the nding that immigration has only a small
eect on aggregate wages, with only the wages of the least skilled workers being adversely
aected by immigration.2 This paper, using a very dierent methodology and dierent,
macroeconomic, data provides macroeconomic support for this analysis by also nding
that immigration shock is not empirically associated with short-run decreases in aggregate
wage rates.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we present and discuss the raw data.
In Section 2.3 we present results from the VAR analysis and in Section 2.4 we discuss to
what extent the standard macroeconomic growth model can be adapted to explain these
results.
1For surveys of the literature see e.g., Uhlig (1999) or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
2See e.g., Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008), as well as the introductions to Ottaviano and Peri
(2012), and Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) and Ortega and Verdugo (2014) for surveys of
this literature.
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Figure 2.1: Live Births 16 years previously are a major and predictable inuence on the Working
Population
2.2 Trends in Population Growth and Immigration
This section presents the data we will be using below in our VAR analysis. One con-
tribution of this section is to compute an unanticipated change in population variable
by removing anticipated changes in the working population caused by publicly recorded
changes in the birth and mortality rates. This is important and interesting for two reasons.
Firstly because controlling for predictable changes in variables in a VARs is necessary to
remove bias, as the work of Ramey (2011a) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)
detail. Secondly when we do construct this series it corresponds quite closely to immi-
gration level which is intuitive. Thus in the VAR section below we interpret the shocks
to unanticipated population as immigration shocks.
Figure 2.1 plots the changes in the rate of growth of the working population and
the number of live births 16 years previously. It shows that they are highly related,
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although not perfectly correlated. VAR analysis assumes that the errors in the VAR are
orthogonal to information contained in the past values of the variables in the VAR, see
e.g., Canova (2007). Thus, it is necessary to remove this predictable element from the
population series, see for example the discussion in Ramey (2011a) and Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012). We do this by constructing an unanticipated change in population
series, WPopUt ; to correct for these predictable eects, using the following formula;
WPopUt = WPopt  WPopAt
where WPopAt = (1  65t 1  mort16 64t 1 )WPopt 1 + (1 mort1 15t 16 )Birthst 16
where the WPopt is the series for working population in the U.S. is taken from Cociuba,
Prescott and Ueberfeldt (2009). WPopAt is the anticipated working population in time
which is equal to the previous year's working population minus an estimate of the pro-
portion aged 64 who will retire, 65t 1; and an estimate of the mortality rate of the working
population plus the births from 16 years previously also adjusted for mortality. The data
used is all freely and publicly available on the Internet. That for mortality rates and birth
rates are taken from 5 yearly samples from the CDC/NCHS National Vital Statistics and
data on the age distribution is taken from decennial census data. Linear interpolation is
used to generate annual numbers for mortality rates.
Figure 2.2 displays the time series for the constructed unanticipated changes in the
working population and also two immigration series. One corresponds to the numbers of
new permanent resident status individuals from the U.S. Census Bureau and the other
is net international migration series from OECD. All series are plotted as a percentage
of the working population. Both immigration series are nearly identical, and the series
23
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Figure 2.2: Unanticipated Changes in Population and Immigration Series. Shaded areas are NBER
recessions.
for the unanticipated changed in working population and two immigration series have a
similar pattern in that they all show a gradual rise from the 1950's to the 1980's and then
a large increase in the latter period of the 1980's and a second peak around 2000 although
the size of this last peak does dier. The rst large peak was caused by the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 which allowed signicant numbers of formerly temporary
workers to apply for permanent resident status after a period of three years.3 The passing
of the act also coincided with a period of high Mexican unemployment and so caused many
temporary workers who would otherwise have returned to their country of origin to remain
3This is known as the Special Agricultural Workers provision.
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in the United States and become permanent residents. It is estimated that 2.3 million
Mexicans took advantage of this possibility, see Durand, Massey and Parrado (1999). The
gradual track to permanent residency also explains why the peak of the new permanent
residents series occurs after that for the changes in working population series.
The series are also similar in scale. Over the sample period 1950-2005 the cumulative
unanticipated changes in the working population is approximately 38.2 million with 17.8
million occurring since 1990. The corresponding numbers for the new permanent residents
series are 31.9 million and 15.7 million. One should not expect a perfect correspondence
between these two gures since one can attain new permanent resident status and not
be part of the working population and vice versa. However the similarity between the
two series is reassuring. Figure 2.2 also plots the NBER business cycle dates with the
recessions shaded in gray. It is noticeable that the response of the unanticipated changes
in working population is more volatile and reactive to recessions than the series for new
permanent residents which is intuitive.
2.3 VAR Analysis
2.3.1 Description of the VAR
We use an 8 dimensional VAR with annual data from 1950 to 2005 for the following
variables; GDP, private consumption, non-residential investment, residential investment,
hours worked, real wages and the two immigration series, the numbers of new permanent
residents and the constructed unanticipated population variable described above.4 All
4The series used the series for gross domestic product personal consumption expenditures, nonresiden-
tial xed investment and Residential Fixed Investment taken from Bureau of Economic Analysis' NIPA
table 1.1.5 all deated by the GDP deator from Table 1.13. The wage series is the Nonfarm Business
Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour, series COMPRNFB, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the
working population and hours worked series come from Cociuba, Prescott and Ueberfeldt (2009).
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Table 2.1: Identifying Sign Restrictions
GDP Non-Res Hours Unantipated
Cons Invest Working Pop.
Business Cycle + + +
Population +
This table shows the sign restrictions on the impulse responses for each identied shock. `Non-Res Inv'
stands for Non-Residential Investment. A "+" means that the impulse response of the variable in question
is restricted to be positive for two years following the shock, including the year of impact. A blank entry
indicates, that no restrictions have been imposed.
variables are real and, with the exception of the wage series, expressed as per capita of
the working population. The VAR has 2 lags, no constant or a time trend, and uses the
logarithm for all variables except for the population variables where we have used the
level.
The VAR in reduced form is given by
Yt =
2X
i=1
BiYt i + ut; t = 1;    ; T; E[utu0t] = 
where Yt are 81 vectors, 2 is the lag length of the VAR, Bi are 88 coecient matrices
and ut is the one step ahead prediction error.
2.3.2 Identication
The problem of identication is to translate the one step ahead prediction errors, ut, into
economically meaningful, or `fundamental', shocks, vt. In this paper we identify shocks
using the sign restriction approach of Uhlig (2005), and Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
Identication in this methodology amounts to identifying a matrix A, such that ut = Avt
and AA0 = . Each column of A represents the immediate impact, or impulse vector, of
a one standard error innovation to a fundamental shocks. Each column is identied as
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the vector which minimizes a criterion function, 	(a), based on the impulse responses of
some of the variables in the VAR to a particular shock's impulse vector, a. If we dene
rja(k) as the impulse response to the impulse vector a of the jth variable at horizon k
then the criterion function, 	(a), is
	(a) =
X
jJS;+
1X
k=0
f

 rja(k)
sj

+
X
jJS; 
1X
k=0
f

rja(k)
sj

;
where f is the function f(x) = 100x if x  0 and f(x) = x if x  0, sj is the standard error
of variable j, JS;+ is the index set of variables, for which identication of a given shock
restricts the impulse response to be positive and JS;  is the same for variables restricted
by identication to be negative. Since we use annual data we only restrict the signs of the
impulses for two periods, i.e., for the two years after the shock. When multiple shocks are
identied there is an additional constraint on the minimization that the identied shock
be orthogonal to previously identied shocks, as detailed in Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
In this paper we use two identication schemes. We rst only identify the unantic-
ipated population/immigration shocks and then we identify two shocks, rst a business
cycle shock and then the unanticipated population/immigration shock. Table 2.1 pro-
vides a description of the identifying sign restrictions for these shocks. The advantage of
the penalty function approach is that, by rewarding larger responses of the correct sign,
it gives the shock identied rst the greatest opportunity to explain the variation in the
data. Thus when the unanticipated population/immigration shock is identied second it
is restricted to explaining the variation in the data left over after the variation explained
by the business cycle shock has been taken out. As well as a robustness exercise this
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses to an Immigration Shock Ordered First.
identication scheme is interesting in its own right, as it should also pick up temporary
variations in immigration which may be associated with business cycle uctuations.
2.3.3 Empirical Results
The impulse responses for these fundamental shocks are shown in Figures 2.3 through
2.5, where we have plotted the impulse responses of all our 8 variables. The shocks are
identied for each draw from the posterior and the 16th, 50th and 84th quantiles plotted,
calculated at each horizon between 0 and 16 years after the shocks. The impulses restricted
by the identifying sign restrictions are identied by the shaded area in the gures.
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The Immigration Shock Ordered First
The impulse responses of the immigration shock, which is the shock to the unanticipated
working population variable in the VAR, are plotted in Figure 2.3. They show that, as
would be predicted by a standard growth model, output and consumption temporarily
fall in response to the immigration shock. However, although there is an increase in
residential investment on impact, there is not a positive response from non-residential
investment which is the response predicted by a growth model after an unexpected increase
in its labor force, see Figure 2.8 below. Indeed the median response of non-residential
investment is always negative. With respect to the labor market real wages do not change
signicantly with the median response being initially positive before coming negative
while average hours worked falls. Again this is not the pattern of responses that would
be predicted by a standard growth model where wages fall on impact after an unexpected
increase in its labor force. Finally note that the response of the new permanent residents
to the immigration shock is intuitive. It is much smoother than the responses of the
unanticipated population variable which is intuitive and consistent with the view that
the unanticipated working population variable will contain more temporary immigrants
than the new permanent residents series.
The scale of the response is a higher than is intuitive. An unexpected increase in the
working population of 0:2% is associated with a fall in the median response of GDP per
working population of greater than 0:2%. However, the condence bands show that the
response of GDP per working population is only signicantly dierent from zero two and
three years after the shock which is more intuitive.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses to a Business Cycle Shock Ordered First.
The Immigration Shock Ordered Second
In this section, we present the impulse responses of the immigration shock when it is iden-
tied second after a business cycle shock. This is important to do for two reasons. Firstly,
because identication methods are never denitive and so there is always a suspicion that
the variation attributed to one identied shock may actually be due to another shock. In
macroeconomics, the business cycle shock is commonly felt to be an important source of
variation and so as a robustness check it is interesting to see whether the responses to the
immigration shock change signicantly once the business cycle variation is accounted for.5
5See Mountford and Uhlig (2009) for more discussion of this.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses to an Immigration Shock Ordered Second After a Business Cycle Shock
Secondly, it is often thought that immigration reacts to the business cycle and that while
the stage of the business cycle should not matter for permanent immigrants, temporary
migrants may be aected by the state of the business cycle.
Figure 2.4 displays the responses to the business cycle shock. These responses of the
non-population variables are as expected and very similar to those in Mountford and
Uhlig (2009). The responses of all the macro variables are positive and persistent. The
population variables both show cyclical variation in response to the business cycle shock
although with a lag. The immigration response is negative on the impact before rising
and becoming signicantly positive after three years after the shock. The new permanent
residents series shows the same pattern but is a much smaller response and so insignicant
31
for all horizons after impact.
Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses of the immigration shock identied after the
business cycle shock. What is striking is how similar the responses are to those in Figure
2.3. This means that the restriction to be orthogonal to the business cycle shock hardly
binds at all which is consistent with the most of the variation in immigration not being
inuenced by the business cycle. The main dierences between Figures 2.5 and 2.3 are
that the error bands around consumption are tighter and the responses of real wages
appears less negative in Figures 2.5. The scale of the response of GDP per working
population is also slightly lower with the upper condence band only falling by about
0:2% in response to an unexpected increase in the working population of 0:2% and again
the condence bands show that the response of GDP per working population is only
signicantly dierent from zero two and three years after the shock.
Adding Labor Share
In Figures 2.6 and 2.7, we substitute a labor share variable in to the VAR in place of
the real wage rate. The variable is the Nonfarm Business Sector: Labor Share, series
PRS85006173, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This is interesting as a robustness
check and also because an increase in the ability of immigrant labor may reduce the
bargaining power of labor and so reduce labor share, see Chapter 3. These Figures do
indeed show evidence that over the medium term labor share does decline in response to
an immigration shock. Thus, the medium term responses of wages and labor share do
seem to dier from their short term eects. This is a large issue see for example the work
of Duenhaupt (2011), Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) and Piketty and Saez (2003,
2006) and which is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is certainly an exciting area for
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses to an Immigration Shock Ordered First With Labor Share.
further research.
2.4 A Growth Model with Immigration Shocks
The evidence discussed in Section 2.3 suggest that while increases in immigration are
associated with temporary decreases in output and consumption per capita, as would be
predicted by an exogenous shock to population in the standard neoclassical growth model,
they are not associated with increases in non-residential investment which would also be
expected in this case. To explain these results we use the ndings of the recent labor
economics literature which suggest that migrant labor is not a substitute for much of the
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Responses to an Immigration Shock Ordered Second after a Business Cycle Shock
with Labor Share.
domestic population, but a complement. For recent evidence on this see Ottaviano and
Peri (2012) for the U.S., Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) for the U.K., and
Ortega and Verdugo (2014) for France. The intuition for these results is that migrants,
perhaps because of poorer communication skills, tend to undertake unskilled work even
when they possess skills themselves and this inux of unskilled labor allows business to
expand without needing to invest in new machinery. The assumption that physical capital
is complementary to skilled labor is well accepted and while the assumption that physical
capital is a substitute for unskilled labor is less common it has support in the literature,
see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
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We therefore adapt the standard neoclassical growth to allow for two types of labor,
unskilled and skilled, and a household which is growing in size though time. To deal
with this added complexity we will follow the literature and assume perfect risk sharing
within the household, see e.g., Gal (2011) or Bruckner and Pappa (2012). Intuitively,
one can think of the household as a composite representative agent made up of a certain
proportion of skilled and unskilled labor which can only be supplied together. This is a
simplifying assumptions that allows the model to be solved in a standard way. There are
clearly possible extensions of the model, such as allowing household members to dier
in some dimension, as in Gal (2011) and Bruckner and Pappa (2012), but this is not
necessary for the purpose of this paper.
We follow the discrete time balanced growth model of Uhlig (2010) with the addition
of stochastic population growth and two types of labor. We will use lower case letters
to denote per capita terms. A representative household's utility function, U , has the
following form
U = E0
1X
t=0
tNtut
where Nt is the number of agents in each household,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and
ut is given by
ut =
(ct(lt))
1    1
1  
with ct denoting per capita consumption, lt denoting per capita labor supplied, 1= > 0 the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and (lt) a strictly positive, decreasing, concave
and thrice dierentiable function. We will assume that (lt) is such that there is a
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constant Frisch elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage rate, see Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011). As mentioned above we will assume that the representative household is a
composite of both types of labor, skilled and unskilled, which it can only supply together
so that lst = l
u
t = lt, where l
s
t and l
u
t is the labor supply of skilled and unskilled household
member's respectively. The proportion of skilled labor in the representative household's
composite labor is the same proportion as in the economy, st , where 
s
t = N
s
t =Nt and
Nt = N
s
t + N
u
t . The representative agent's labor supply decision is to choose lt subject
to the weighted average wage, wt = w
s
t
s
t + w
u
t 
u
t . The household's budget constraint is
in each period therefore
ctNt + xtNt = wtltNt + rtktNt;
where xt is investment per person, kt is the capital per person, wt is the wage rate, and
rt is the capital rental rate. Capital accumulates via investment thus
kt+1Nt+1 = (1  )ktNt + xtNt:
Production takes place under perfect competition and constant returns to scale ac-
cording to a CES production function. We use the standardized function form as in
Cantore, Ferroni, and Leon-Ledesma (2012),
yt =
"


kt
k
 1

+ (1  )

lt
u
t
lu
 1

# 
 1 
lt
s
t
ls
1 
;
where yt = Yt=Nt. The parameter  2 (0;1) denotes the degree of substitutability
between capital and unskilled labor. Capital and unskilled labor are perfect complements
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as  approaches 0, while they are perfect substitutes if  ! 1. As  approaches 1,
the production function becomes Cobb-Douglas. The parameter  denotes the capital
intensity in production. Factor prices are determined by factors marginal products so
that
rt =
yt
kt

 
kt
k
 1


 
kt
k
 1
 + (1  )

ltut
lu
 1

 ;
wut =
yt
ltut
(1  )

ltut
lu
 1


 
kt
k
 1
 + (1  )

ltut
lu
 1

 ;
wst =(1  )
yt
ltst
:
The stochastic process population growth is
Nt
Nt 1
= Nt ;
where Nt is a stationary stochastic process with mean 
N . Finally, the market clear-
ing/feasibility constraint is given by
ct + xt = yt:
2.4.1 Modeling Immigration Shocks
We model an immigration shock as a shock which leads to an increase in the proportion
of unskilled labor in the economy, ut , as well an increase in the working population.
We use a broad denition of skills and set s = 0:9 which is justied by the fact that
90% of young people graduate from high school in the U.S., although clearly alternative
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Table 2.2: The Log-linearized Equations of the Model
byt = [bkt + (1  )(blt + but )] + (1  )(blt + bst ) byt = (c=y)bct + (x=y)bxtbwut = byt   (blt + but )     1  bkt + ( 1 )(blt + but ) bwst = byt   (blt + bst )brt = byt   bkt + (1  )( 1 )bkt   (1  )( 1 )(blt + but ) bwt = 1!Sblt + bctbkt+1 = (1 )N bkt + h1  (1 )N i bxt   bNt+1 bt =  bct   (1  )bltbwt = s( bwst + bst ) + (1  s)( bwut + but ) 0 = Et[bt+1   bt + bRt+1]bRt = (1  (1  ))brt but =  (s=u)bstbNt = N bNt 1 + "Nt
This table shows the equations of the log-linearized version of the model
interpretations and calibrations are possible. Given this if at the steady state the working
population increases by a% and all of this increase is in unskilled workers then the new
share of unskilled workers will rise to u;newt = (100
u + a)=(100 + a) and so but =
(100a(1  u))=(100 + a)u.6 Thus an immigration shock in our model is a simultaneous
shock to both population, Nt ; and also to 
u
t . The proportion of unskilled amongst
immigrants can be varied so that the size of the response of but also varies. This is
discussed below.
2.4.2 Log-Linearizing around the Balanced Growth Path
In order to be able to log-linearize around the steady state, we need to detrend variables
on the balanced growth path. Following Uhlig (2010), we will denote log-deviations
by hats so that bct = log(ct)   log(c)  (ct   c)=c where c is the steady state value of
ct. Thus noting that but =  (s= u)bst and that wt = wstst + wut ut and so bwt =
s( bwst + bst ) + (1  s)( bwut   bst ) where s = wss=w and w = wss +wuu, we can write
the log-linearized equations of the model as in Table 2.2.7
6Thus, a 1% increase in population will increase the share of unskilled agents from 0:10 to 11=101 =
0:1089 which is a percentage increase of (100 0:9)=(101 0:1) = 90=10:1 = 8:9%:
7See Section A.3 in Appendix A for the details of derivations.
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Choosing Parameters
On the balanced growth path, we have lt+1 = lt = l and ct+1 = ct for any period of time
t. Hence, the rst order-conditions imply that 1 = Et[(1 + r   )], and in the steady
state we have
r =
1

  (1  ): (2.1)
Following Uhlig (2010) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), we set the depreciation rate to
be  = 0:07, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set at 0:5, hence  = 2.
The discount rate  = 0:998 hence R  (1 + r   ) = 1= = 1=0:998 = 1:002. From
above we know that r = y=k and so given calibrated value for ; and  and given that
r = 1=   (1   ), we will have an expression for y=k . Thus if  = 0:4 and  = 0:9
then y=k = 0:072=0:36 = 0:2, hence k=y = 4:99. The capital accumulation equation in
the steady state gives x=y = (k=y)[N   (1   )] = 4:99[1:012   0:93] = 0:41, which is
similar to that in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and which implies that c=y = 0:59: Given
these values,  = (1  )(y=c) = 1:085 and 1=!S = 1=  (1  1=) = 0:458, where we
calibrate the Frisch elasticity, , to be unity following Uhlig (2010). There is no estimate
of the degree of substitutability between capital and unskilled labor, so we set it to be
 = 0:5, assuming that they are mild complements. We will explore impulse response
functions for alternative values of .
2.4.3 Impulse Responses
We discuss the impulse responses from two kinds of a shock. In Figure 2.8 we present
what we call an immigration shock where both the rate of population growth and the
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proportion of unskilled workers in the economy have a positive shock in the manner
described in Section 2.4.1. In Figure 2.9 by way of contrast we present the impulse of a
pure population shock which is a positive shock to the rate of population growth with no
change in the proportion of unskilled workers in the economy.
The immigration shock in Figure 2.8 has many features in common with the VAR
impulses responses in Figures 2.3 and 2.5. Notably GDP per capita and and consumption
per capita both decline before recovering back towards their balanced growth paths. This
is also the case for the pure population shock as shown in Figure 2.9. However, the
similarity does not carry over to the response of investment where in the pure population
shock, in Figure 2.9 investment rises immediately in response to the population shock as
the economy wide capital to labor ratio falls. In contrast in response to an immigration
shock in Figure 2.8, investment falls as the increased in unskilled labor substitutes for
capital in the production function. This investment dynamics is robust to higher values
of . The response of unskilled wage rates also diers greatly between the two cases with
unskilled wages falling sharply in response to an immigration shock while skilled wages
initially rise in response to the immigration shock before falling slightly.
The responses to the immigration shock in Figure 2.8 are much closer to the VAR
responses of Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.5 than those of Figure 2.9. However, they are
clearly not a perfect t. The most notable discrepancy is that aggregate wages still fall in
response to an immigration shock. It is interesting to note however that the skilled wage
does initially rise in response to an immigration shock before falling which is indeed the
qualitative response of the wage variable in the VAR. Note that in our calibration 90% of
labor is skilled labor and so if the wage variable in the VAR - Nonfarm Business Sector
wage rate - has a greater skill component than the economy as a whole, or if immigrants
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wages do not make it onto the ocial wage data then the equivalent variable to the VAR
in this model would indeed be the skilled wage responses. However, we do not model an
informal sector in this paper and so again we leave this as a potential fruitful avenue for
further research.
2.5 Conclusion
The paper has presented macroeconomic evidence on the eects of immigration on the
macroeconomy. It has shown empirically that immigration shocks are not associated rises
in non-residential investment or short run reductions in average wages. It has shown
how a standard growth model with a CES production function where migrant labor
and capital are complements to skilled domestic labor can produce responses closer to
those of the VAR than a skill-neutral shock to the working population. Thus using a
very dierent empirical and theoretical methodology, as well as macroeconomic data, this
paper has provided empirical support for the microeconomic nding that immigrant labor
is complementary to, rather than a substitute for, most native labor.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse Responses to an Immigration Shock { a shock where population rises and the
proportion of unskilled workers in the labor force also rises.
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Figure 2.9: Impulse Responses to a pure Population Shock { a shock where population rises and the
proportion of skiiled and unskilled workers is unchanged.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1 Log-Linearizing around the Balanced Growth Path
This appendix reports the details of how we derived the rst-order conditions and the
log-linearized equations as well as the steady state conditions.
A.2 Derivations of the First-Order Conditions
A.2.1 Household's Problem
Setting up the Lagrangian:
L =E0
1X
t=0
t

Nt
(ct(lt))
1    1
1     t(ctNt + kt+1Nt+1   (1  )ktNt   wtltNt   rtktNt)

:
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The rst-order conditions with respect to ct, lt and kt+1 are given by
[ct] : Ntc
 
t ((lt))
1    tNt = 0
, t = c t ((lt))1 
[lt] : Ntc
1 
t ((lt))
 0(lt) + twtNt = 0
, c1 t ((lt)) 0(lt) + twt = 0
[kt+1] :   tNt+1 + Et[t+1(1   + rt+1)Nt+1] = 0
, 1 = Et



t+1
t

Rt+1

: (A.1)
where Rt := (1 + rt   ). Now combining the rst two conditions implies that
wt =  ct
0(lt)
(lt)
: (A.2)
Thus, in the steady state we have
wl
c
==  
0(l)l
(l)
=: : (A.3)
Note that in the steady state Equation (A.1) implies that
1 = (1   + r), r = 1

  (1  ):
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A.2.2 Firm's Problem
Factor prices are determined by the marginal products so that
rt =
"


kt
k
 1

+ (1  )

lt
u
t
lu
 1

# 
 1 1


1
k
 1

k
 1

 1
t

lt
s
t
ls
1 
, = yt

 
kt
k
 1
 + (1  )

ltut
lu
 1

kt
k
 1


1
kt

, =yt
kt
(ktk )
 1


 
kt
k
 1
 + (1  )

ltut
lu
 1

 :
Note that in the steady state this implies r = y=k. Similarly,
wut =
"


kt
k
 1

+ (1  )

lt
u
t
lu
 1

# 
 1 1
(1  )

1
lu
 1

(lt
u
t )
 1

 1

lt
s
t
ls
1 
, = yth
(ktk )
 1
 + (1  )( ltutlu )
 1

i(1  ) ltut
lu
 1


1
ltut

, = yt
ltut
(1  )( ltutul )
 1
h
(ktk )
 1
 + (1  )( ltutlu )
 1

i :
Note that in the steady state this implies wu = (1  )y=(lu). Finally,
wst =(1  )
"


kt
k
 1

+ (1  )

lt
u
t
lu
 1

# 
 1 
lt
s
t
ls
  1
ls
, =(1  ) yt
ltst
:
Note that in the steady state this implies ws = (1  )y=(ls). Given these steady-state
values the aggregate wage is w = wss+wuu = (1 )(y=l) in the steady state, which
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in turn implies that the parameter , dened in (A.3), can be also expressed as
 =
wl
c
= (1  )y
c
:
A.3 Derivations of Log-linearized Equations
In this section, we describe the details of derivations of log-linearized equations. Here, hats
over variables indicate percent deviation from the steady state, e.g., bct = log(ct) log(c) 
(ct   c)=c.
A.3.1 Labor Supply
Taking the rst-order Taylor expansion of Equation (A.2) around the steady state gives
0 = 0(l)c
(ct   c)
c
+(l)w
(wt   w)
w
+ [c00(l) + w0(l)]l
(lt   l)
l
:
Dividing through by 0(l)c gives and remembering bct = (ct   c)=c,
bct =  (l)w
0(l)c
bwt   [c00(l)l + w0(l)l]
0(l)c
blt
From the rst order conditions we know (l)w0(l)c =  1 and that    
0(l)l
(l) = wl=c and
dening 1=!S  +00(l)l=0(l) then we can write
bwt = 1
!S
blt + bct:
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These results follow from the functional form of (lt) as shown by Trabanadt and Uhlig
(2011). They show that the function  must have the form
(lt) =

1  (1  )l1+
1

t
 
1 
then,
0(lt) =  
1  

1  (1  )l1+
1

t
 
1  1
(1  )l
1

t

1 +
1


00(lt) =

1  


1     1

1  (1  )l1+
1

t
 
1  2
2(1  )2l
2

t

1 +
1

2
  
1  

1  (1  )l1+
1

t
 
1  1
(1  )l
1

 1
t

1 +
1


1

:
Hence,
00(lt)lt
0(lt)
=
1

 


1     1

1  (1  )l1+
1

t
 1
(1  )l1+
1

t

1 +
1


;
and
   
0(lt)lt
(lt)
=

1  

1  (1  )l1+
1

t
 1
(1  )l1+
1

t

1 +
1


:
Thus,
00(lt)lt
0(lt)
=
1

  


1    1


1 
=
1

  

2  1


:
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Thus,
1
!S
 + 
00(l)l
0
=+
1

  

2  1


=
1

  

1  1


;
which is the same as in Uhlig (2010).
A.3.2 Lagrange Multiplier
Taking the rst-order Taylor expansion of t = ct((lt))
1  gives,

(t   )

=  c (l)1  (ct   c)
c
+ (1  )c (l) 0(l)l (lt   l)
l
, bt =  bct + (1  )c (l)1 0(l)l
(l)
blt
, bt =  bct   (1  )blt;
where we use the steady state relatihonship of  = c (l)1  and  = 0(l)l=(l).
A.3.3 Intertemporal
Now log-linearizing (A.1) gives
1 =Et
h
R exp(bt+1   bt + bRt+1)i
, 0 =Et
hbt+1   bt + bRt+1i
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A.3.4 Capital Return
Log-linearizing around its steady states gives
Rt = (1 + rt   )
, R exp( bRt) = 1   + r exp(brt)
, bRt = r
R
brt
, = (1  (1  ))brt;
where the last equality use the stedy state relationship that R = 1+ r    and R =  1.
A.3.5 Capital Accumulation
The capital accumulation equation can be rewritten in terms of per-capita variables as
follows
kt+1Nt+1 = (1  )ktNt + xtNt
, kt+1Nt+1
Nt
= (1  )kt + xt
, kt+1Nt+1 = (1  )kt + xt
In the steady state,
kN = (1  )k + x, x
k
= N   1 +  (A.4)
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Log-linearizing gives
kN exp(bkt+1 + bNt+1) = (1  )k exp(bkt) + x exp(bxt)
, kN (bkt+1 + bNt+1) = (1  )kbkt + xbxt
, bkt+1 + bNt+1 = (1  )N bkt + xk

1
N
 bxt
Substituting (A.4),
bkt+1 = 1  
N
bkt + 1  (1  )
N
 bxt   bNt+1:
A.3.6 Share of Skilled and Unskilled Labor
Nt = Ns;t +Nu;t
, 1 = Ns;t
Nt
+
Nu;t
Nt
= st + 
u
t :
In the steady state,
1 = s + u:
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Thus, log-linearizing
1 = s exp( bst) + u exp(but )
, = s(1 + bst ) + u(1 + but )
, 0 = s bst + ucut
, but =  su bst =   s1  s bst :
A.3.7 Production Function
Log-linearizing the production function:
yt =
"


kt
k
 1

+ (1  )

lt
u
t
lu
 1

# 
 1 
lt
s
t
ls
1 
;
it is easiest to dene a new function ft:
ft = 

kt
k
 1

+ (1  )

lt
u
t
lu
 1

;
and so f = (kk )
 1
 + (1   )(ulul )
 1
 = 1 in the steady state, and log-linearizing of ft
gives:
f exp( bft) =  k exp(bkt)
k
! 1

+ (1  )
 
lu exp(blt + but )
lu
! 1

, 1 + bft =  exp    1

bkt+ (1  ) exp    1


(blt + but )
= 

1 +

   1

bkt+ (1  ) 1 +    1


(blt + but )
, bft =    1


[bkt + (1  )(blt +cut )]:
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. Thus, log-linearizing of yt gives:
yt =f

 1
t

lt
s
t
ls
1 
, byt = 
   1
 bft + (1  )(blt + bst )
=[bkt + (1  )(blt + but )] + (1  )(blt + bst ):
A.3.8 Capital Rental Rate
Using ft dened above,
rt =
yt
kt

 
kt
k
 1


 
kt
k
 1
 + (1  )

ltut
lu
 1

 = yt
kt
 
kt
k
 1

ft
:
Thus log-linearizing gives
brt = byt   bkt   bft +    1

bkt
, = byt   bkt      1


[bkt + (1  )(blt + but )] +    1
bkt
, = byt   bkt + (1  )   1

bkt   (1  )   1


(blt + but )
A.3.9 Wages for Unskilled Labor
Similarly, using ft,
wut =
yt
ltut
(1  )

ltut
lu
 1


 
kt
k
 1
 + (1  )

ltut
lu
 1

 = yt
ltut
(1  )

ltut
lu
 1

ft
:
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Thus, log-linearizing
bwut = byt   (blt + but )  bft +    1

(blt + but )
, = byt   (blt + but )     1

[bkt + (1  )(blt + but )] +    1

(blt + but )
, = byt   (blt + but )     1
bkt +    1


(blt + but ):
A.3.10 Wages for Skilled Labor
Log-linearizing of wst = (1  )yt=(ltst ) gives
bwst = byt   (blt + bst ):
A.3.11 Aggregate Wages
Log-linearizing aggregate wages:
wt =w
s
t
s
t + w
u
t 
u
t
w exp( bwt) =wss exp( bwst + bst ) + wuu exp( bwut + but )
, w(1 + bwt) =wss(1 + bwst + bst ) + wuu(1 + bwut + but )
, bwt =s( bwst + bst ) + (1  s)( bwut   bst );
where s := wss=w.
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A.3.12 Resource Constraint
The feasibility constraint is given by
yt = ct + xt:
Thus, log-linearizing
y exp(byt) = c exp(bct) + x exp(bxt)
, y(1 + byt) = c(1 + bct) + x(1 + bxt)
, byt = c
y
bct + x
y
bxt:
A.4 List of log-linearized Equations
Thus to summarize we can write the log-linearized equations of the model as
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Table 2.3: The Log-Linearized Equations
Neoclassical Growth Model with CES Production and Immigration
Household
(1) bwt = 1!Sblt + bct
(2) bt =  bct   (1  )blt
(3) 0 = Et
hbt+1   bt + bRt+1i
(4) bRt = (1  (1  ))brt
(5) bkt+1 = 1 N bkt + h1  (1 )N i bxt   bNt+1
(6) but =   s1 s bst
Firm
(7) byt = [bkt + (1  )(blt + but )] + (1  )(blt + bst )
(8) brt = byt   bkt + (1  )   1  bkt   (1  )   1  (blt + but )
(9) bwt = s( bwst + bst ) + (1  s)( bwut   bst )
(10) bwut = byt   (blt + but )     1  bkt +    1  (blt + but )
(11) bwst = byt   blt   bst
Resource Constraint
(12) byt = cybct + xy bxt
Exogenous Processes
(a) bNt = N bNt 1 + Nt
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Chapter 3
Bargaining and Immigration in a
Macro Model
3.1 Introduction
The United States has experienced (at least) three changes in labor market dynamics over
the last three decades. First, the labor share of national income has been falling, which
has also been observed in many developed countries. Figure 3.1 shows the time series
for labor income share in the United States from 1950 to 2007. The labor share looks
stable in the rst half of this period, which is consistent with Kaldor's (1957) stylized
fact of economic growth and Blanchard's (1997) work. However, it took a downward turn
around the 1990's and showed a sharp decline after 2000.1 Figure 3.1 also displays a
simple regression of labor share on time, which shows a clearly negative relationship. If
we exclude the top one percent of income earners, the decline in labor share would be
more severe, since the fraction of wages and salaries in top incomes have also been rising.
1The average of labor share from 1950 to 1987 is about 64%, while from 1987 to 2007 it is about 60%.
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Empirical evidence for this can be found in Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006) and Atkinson,
Piketty, and Saez (2011).
Figure 3.1: The Decline of Labor Share in the U.S.
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Labor Share in the U.S.
The second change is the steady increase in the immigration share as discussed in
Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. Figure 3.2 displays two time series for immigration share, which
corresponds to the share of new permanent residents in the working population and net
international migration. It is noticeable that both have a similar pattern and that the
immigration ow keeps rising, with two peaks around the late 1980's and in the early
2000's. This signicant increase in migration ow was generally caused on the part of
generous immigration policies by the U.S. government. See Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 for
a brief description of U.S. immigration policies.
Lastly, the bargaining power of workers has been declining. As shown in the top
left panel in Figure 3.3, the ratio of the U.S. federal minimum wage to hourly earnings
showed a decrease from 0.47 % in 1970 to 0.33 % in 2007. The decline was accompanied
by a decrease both in union membership and in the net replacement ratios (ratio of
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Figure 3.2: The Increase in Immigration in the U.S.
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unemployment benet to employment income) for a single person and one earner with
two children, which is also shown in Figure 3.3. These facts indicate that the relative
position of workers declined during this period, which can be interpreted as a decline of
the bargaining power of workers.
In this paper, we seek to explore the possible connections between the three changes
described above, and examine theoretically the macroeconomic eects of immigration
on labor market outcomes, especially labor share, for alternative assumptions on bar-
gaining power. We adopt a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework
with the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of labor market frictions (Diamond, 1982;
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) since a standard DSGE model fails to address the is-
sues of labor market outcomes. This is because, in a standard model, the labor market
is competitive and the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor. With the stan-
dard assumption of the Cobb-Douglass production function, this implies that labor share
remains constant. Consequently, there is growing literature on policy analyses using a
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Figure 3.3: The Decline in Bargaining Power of Workers in the U.S.
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DSGE with search and matching model { see, e.g., Walsh (2005), Trigari (2006), Blan-
chard and Gal (2010). A textbook exposition of a DSGE model with labor market search
can be found in Shimer (2010).
Specically, this paper employs the model of Bruckner and Pappa (2012) (the BP
model, hereafter), which is a New Keynesian model with search frictions in the labor
market, a labor force participation choice, and heterogeneous unemployed workers. In
their model, there are two types of unemployed workers, insiders and outsiders, and they
are dierent in that the former faces a more ecient matching function, and hence, the
job nding rates for insiders are higher than those of outsiders. It is possible to interpret
insiders as skilled workers and outsiders as unskilled workers. We think the distinction
between inside and outside labor may well be helpful in discussing the impact of immi-
gration on the macroeconomy because immigration could be thought of as an exogenous
shock reaction to the numbers of outsiders (this assumption is relaxed in Section 3.4).
This will lead to a reduction in the bargaining power of labor, and as a result, a fall in
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wage rates and labor income share. Indeed in Chapter 2 we identify immigration shocks
using a VAR with sign restrictions and nd that increases in immigrant labor do reduce
labor share over the medium term.
Our paper is closest to a recent work by Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), which
analyzes the impact of immigration on labor market outcomes using a search and matching
model. Though their model has many features in common with ours, such as dierential
search costs between natives and immigrants, they also allow for skill heterogeneity among
natives, which enables them to address distributional issues. However, Chassamboulli
and Palivos (2014) assume that the bargaining power of workers is constant and do not
examine dynamics of labor share.
There are some recent studies that attempt to explain the decline in the labor share
in the U.S. and the globe. Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2013) have shown that oshoring of
the labor-intensive component of U.S. production to countries with lower labor costs is a
major reason for the recent decline in the U.S. labor share. Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2013) have pointed out that the decrease in the relative price of investment brought
about by the evolution of information technology leads to a shift away from labor towards
capital, and hence, the decline in the global labor share. This paper contributes to the
literature by showing that the decline in worker's bargaining power caused by an increase
in immigration could be one reason for the decline in labor share.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we outline the theoretical
model. Section 3.3 discusses the results of the simulation. Section 3.4 extends the as-
sumption of the baseline and considers two cases where immigrants enter a host economy
(i) with employment and (ii) as insiders. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 The Model
In this section, we extend the BP model to allow for immigration. The model consists
of households, rms (intermediate and retail), and a government which conducts both
monetary and scal policy. Each household consists of a continuum of innitely-lived
employed workers, two types of unemployed workers (the short term and the long term
unemployed), and non-participants. Immigrations are assumed to be the exogenous shock
to the number of outsiders in the baseline. We also consider alternative scenarios where
immigrants arrives as employed workers or insiders. We can interpret employment-based
immigration as the case where employers sponsor immigrant workers for green cards
based on employment, while insider immigration can be viewd as immigration through a
family member (i.e., family reunications), depending on the assumption on the matching
prospects.
Households supply labor services to the intermediate rms and earn wages when em-
ployed, while they search for jobs and earn unemployment benet when unemployed, or
enjoy leisure when not participated in a labor market. Intermediate rms hire workers in
a frictional labor market, i.e., they increase their current workforce by posting vacancies,
which is costly. They then produce intermediate goods by using capital and labor and sell
the products to retailers, which dierentiate them and sell to households in a competitive
market. Adding retailers allows us to incorporate inertia in price setting. In the following,
we explain the details of the model.
3.2.1 Immigration
At any time of t, the number of household members who are employed is denoted by
Et, the number of short term unemployed (we call them insiders) is denoted by U
I
t , the
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number of long-term unemployed (we call them outsiders) is denoted by UOt , and the
number of non-participants (i.e., out of labor force) is denoted by Lt.
At the beginning of the period, we assume that there is the exogenous ow of immi-
grations into the host economy. Since newly immigrated people are likely to have less
chances of nding jobs, we treat them as outsiders and denote it as Migt, which follows
a stationary stochastic process. The total population in the domestic economy, Nt, is
therefore given by
Nt = Et + U
I
t + U
O
t +Migt + Lt;
or equivalently
1 = et + u
I
t + u
O
t +migt + lt (3.1)
where et; u
I
t ; u
O
t ;migt, and lt are proportions in the total population. In period t + 1,
the number of Migt+1 are newly immigrated in the domestic economy, and therefore, the
total population of the domestic economy evolves as
Nt+1 = Nt +Migt+1
, Nt+1
Nt
=
1
1 migt+1 =: 
N
t+1: (3.2)
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3.2.2 Matching
The aggregate number of matches in the economy,Mt, is given by the sum of the constant-
returns-to-scale matching function of insiders and that of outsiders, whose inputs are
vacancies that rms create and unemployed workers.
Mt =M
I
t (Vt; U
I
t ) +M
O
t (Vt; U
O
t +Migt)
=ImV

t (u
I
tNt)
1  + OmV

t ((u
O
t +migt)Nt)
1  (3.3)
where Vt is the aggregate vacancy, and 
I
m > 
O
m > 0 is assumed. That is, insiders
face more ecient matching technology than outsiders. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies. The aggregate job nding
rates for insiders and outsiders are dened respectively as
Iht :=
M It
uItNt
(3.4)
Oht :=
MOt
(uOt +migt)Nt
(3.5)
and ht := 
Ih
t + 
Oh
t . The aggregate vacancy lling rate is
ft :=
Mt
Vt
(3.6)
Using the job nding rates dened above, the transition equation for employment is
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expressed as
Et+1 = (1  )Et +M It +MOt
, et+1Nt = (1  )etNt + Iht uItNt + Oht (uOt +migt)Nt: (3.7)
where  2 (0; 1) is the exogenous job destruction rate, and et := Et=Nt 1 represents
employment per person at the beginning of time t. Similarly, the transition for insiders
is given by
U It+1 = (1  )U It + Et  M It
, euIt+1Nt = (1  )uItNt + etNt   Iht uItNt (3.8)
where  2 (0; 1) is the probability of becoming outsiders and euIt := U It =Nt 1.
3.2.3 Household
The household's total instantaneous utility function takes the form
u(ct; lt)Nt =
 
c1 t
1   +
l1 t
1  
!
Nt; (3.9)
where ct is the consumption of each member of the household at time t, lt, as is dened
in (3.1), is the fraction of non-participants who enjoy leisure, 1= is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution,  is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,  > 0 is
a preference parameter that measures the disutility from being in the labor market. As
common in the macroeconomic literature, full risk sharing among household members is
assumed so that they can insure themselves against income uncertainty and unemploy-
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ment.2 The household's problem is expressed as
J (kt; et; uIt ; bt) = max
ct;kt+1;bt+1;et+1;uIt+1;u
O
t
 
c1 t
1   +
l1 t
1  
!
Nt
+ EtJ (kt+1; et+1; uIt+1; bt+1) (3.10)
subject to total population (3.1), the law of motion for employed workers (3.7) and that
of insiders (3.8), the following budget constraint (3.11), and the capital accumulation
equation with adjustment costs (3.12):
ctNt + itNt +
bt+1Nt+1
ptRt
 rtktNt + wtetNt + ben(uIt + uOt (1 +migt))Nt +
btNt
pt
+ protNt   ttNt; (3.11)
ekt+1Nt =(1  )ktNt + itNt   !
2
 ekt+1
kt
  N
!2
ktNt; (3.12)
where it is investment, bt is the government bond, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate,
pt is price level, wt is real wage, rt is the rental rate of capital, ben is unemployment
benets, prot is prots from rms, tt is lump sum taxes, kt is capital,  2 (0; 1) is the
depreciation rate, ! captures the degree of adjustment costs, and ekt := Kt=Nt 1.
As common in the literature,3 we dene the marginal value to the household of having
one member employed rather than unemployed, and that of being insider unemployed by
2See, e.g., Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), Gal (2011) and Bruckner and Pappa (2012).
3See, e.g., Ravn (2008), Shimer (2010), Monacelli, Gertler and Trigari (2010).
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using the rst-order conditions to the household's problem above as follows:4
VEt =  l t Nt + c t wtNt + (1  )Et
VEt+1
Nt+1
+ Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
; (3.13)
VUIt =  l t Nt + c t benNt + Iht Et
VEt+1
Nt+1
+ ((1  )  Iht )Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
(3.14)
The marginal value to the household of an employed worker consists of the disutility from
being in the labor market,  @u(ct; lt)Nt=@lt =  l t Nt, the wage rates, wt, multiplied
by the marginal utility of wealth c t and the total numbers in household members, Nt,
and the continuation value, which is the value of being employed if the match is not
terminated, which occurs with the probability (1   ), and the value of becoming an
insider if it is destroyed, which occurs with the probability . The continuation value is
discounted by the discounted factor, , and adjusted by the expected population growth
rate Nt+1. Similarly, the marginal value to the household of being an insider consists of
the disutility from being in the labor market, and unemployment benet, ben, and the
continuation value. Note that an insider nds a job with the probability Iht , as dened in
(3.4), and remains an insider with the probability ((1 ) Iht ) since an insider becomes
an outsider with the probability .
3.2.4 Intermediate Firms
Intermediate rms employ the aggregate household's labor Et and aggregate capital, Kt,
to produce goods. The production function is given by:
Yt = F (Kt; Et) = K
'
t (Et)
1 '; (3.15)
4See 3.5 in Appendix B for derivations
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where ' 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of output with respect to capital. The value function of
a rm with Et currently employed workers is:
V(Et) = max
Kt;Vt
xtF (Kt; Et)  wtEt   rtKt   Vt + Ett+1V((1  )Et + ft Vt| {z }
=Et+1
) (3.16)
where xt is the relative price of intermediate goods, t+1 = uct+1=uct is the stochastic
discount factor, and  > 0 is the cost of posting vacancies. The rst-order conditions for
Kt and Vt are;
[Kt] : ' xt
Yt
Kt
= rt; (3.17)
[Vt] :

ft
= Et

ct
ct+1

VFt+1; (3.18)
where VFt is the value of lling a vacancy which is dened as5
VFt := (1  ')xt
Yt
Et
  wt + (1  ) 
ft
: (3.19)
Therefore, the optimal vacancy condition (3.18), together with (3.19), states that the
marginal cost of positing a vacancy should equal the expected marginal benet, which is
the marginal product of labor minus the wage plus the continuation value, knowing that
the match can be terminated with probability .
5See Section B.2 in Appendix B for the derivation.
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3.2.5 Bargaining over Wages
The Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log post-match sur-
pluses:
max
wt
(1  #) lnVEt + # lnVFt (3.20)
where # 2 (0; 1) denotes the rms' bargaining power. The rst-order condition with
respect to wt leads to the following Nash wage equation:
wt = (1  #)
"
(1  ')xt yt
et
+
Oht
ft
#
+ #[ben  ct EtVUIt+1]: (3.21)
In words, the equilibrium Nash bargained wage is the weighted average of the marginal
product of labor plus the value to the rm of marginal job (=ft ), multiplied by the
vacancy lling rate for an outsider, and the outside option of being unemployed minus
the expected value of becoming an insider next period if the match is destroyed.
3.2.6 Retailers and Price Setting
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i 2 [0; 1], which
buy intermediate goods and dierentiate them with a technology that transforms one unit
of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods. The relative price of intermediate
goods, xt, coincides with the real marginal cost that the retailers face. Final goods are
expressed as the composite of individual retail goods Yit:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y
 1

it di
 
 1
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where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Retail rms can
optimize their price with a xed probability 1 p 2 (0; 1) in any period following Calvo
(1983), which will lead to the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve:6
t = Ett+1 + bxt
where t is the ination rate of prices of retail goods, and  = (1   p)(1   p)=p.
Hat over the marginal cost denotes the deviation from the steady state. Monetary policy
follows an interest rate rule:
Rt = R exp(t):
Government nances the expenditure on unemployment benets and government spend-
ing by lump sum tax,
ben Ut +Gt = Tt:
Resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + Vt:
3.2.7 List of Log-linearized Equations
We log-linearize per-capita equations around the steady states. We will denote log-
deviations by hats over variables so that for a generic aggregate variable Xt, bxt =
log(xt)  log(x)  (ext x)=x where xt := Xt=Nt and x is the steady state value of xt. The
only exception is the ination rate, t, which is expressed as a percentage deviation from
the steady state of zero ination, so that bt = t. The log-linearized dynamics of the
6See, e.g., Gal (2008) for the derivation.
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model is shown in Table 3.1.7 Equations (1) to (27) determine 27 endogenous variables:
yt; ct; it; kt;ekt; rt; et; et; uIt ; euIt ; uOt ; lt; wt; Rt; xt; t;mIt ;mOt ; vt, Iht , Oht , Ift , Oft , ft , et,
ut, 
N
t . Equation (a) represents an exogenous process.
3.3 Simulation
3.3.1 Parameter Values
In the baseline calibration, we take the period in the model to correspond to a quarter and
set the model parameters to t the U.S. economy. The values are taken from Bruckner
and Pappa (2012). Table 3.2 summarizes the calibration. The new parameter introduced
here, the steady-state immigration rate,mig, is set to 0.0057/4, following Ben-Gad (2012).
The implies annual (gross) population growth rate is about 1:0057.
It is assumed that the discount factor  = 0.99 (implying an annualized steady-state
real interest rate of approximately 4 percent), the relative risk aversion parameter  = 2,
the capital share ' = 0:3, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply = 4, the elasticity of
substitution  = 6 (implying a gross steady-state markup is equal to 1:2), the degree
of price stickiness p = 0:75 (implying an average price duration of four quarters), and
the capital depreciation rate  = 0:01 (implying annual depreciation rate of 4 percent),
the capital adjustment cost ! = 2, the coecient on ination in the interest rate rule
 = 1:5, and the steady-state value for government spending to output ratio g=y = 0:18.
For these values, conventional values are used.
Total unemployment rate is set to 0.055, and according to CPS data, the share of the
long-term unemployed in total unemployment is set to 0.16. We use the aggregate job
nding rate h = 0:83, following Shimer (2010). The aggregate vacancy lling rate f
7See Section B.3 in Appendix B for the details of the derivations.
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Table 3.1: The Log-Linearized Equations of the Model
Bruckner and Pappa (2012) model with immigration
(1) bet+1 = 1 N  bet +  mIe N  bmIt +  mOe N  bmOt
(2) bet = bet   bNt
(3) bmIt = bvt + (1  )buIt
(4) bmOt =  bvt + (1  ) h uOuO+mig buOt + miguO+mig dmigti
(5) bIht = bmIt   buIt
(6) bOht = bmOt   uOuO+mig buOt   miguO+mig dmigt
(7)
bekt+1 = 1 N bkt + 1  1 N bit
(8) bkt = bekt   bNt
(9) beuIt+1 = 1 N  buIt +   euIN  bet    mIuIN  bmIt
(10) buIt = beuIt   bNt
(11) 0 = ebet + uIbuIt + uO buOt +mig dmigt + lblt
(12) bct + !N bkt = Et  bct+1   rbrt+1   !(N )2bekt+2 + wN bekt+1 + !(N )2bkt+1
(13) 
Ohe
Ohe+c ben
(bOht + bet)  c benOhe+c benbct =  blt
(14) ubut = Et[ c benbct+1 + Ihebet+1 + u[(1  )  Ih]but+1
+Ih[e   u]bIht+1 +l blt+1]
(15) ebet = Et[ c wbct+1 + c w bwt+1 + (1  )ebnt+1 + ubut+1 +l blt+1]
(16) bct = Etbct+1   1 ( bRt   Etbt+1)
(17) byt = 'bkt + (1  ')bet
(18) bIft = bmIt   bvt
(19) bOft = bmOt   bvt
(20) 
f
bft + f bct = f Etbct+1 + (1  ')xyeEt(bet+1   bxt+1   byt+1) + wEt bwt+1
+(1  ) 
f
Etbft+1
(21) w bwt = (1  #)(1  ')xye (bxt + byt   bet)  #cl blt   #cubut
+#c(l    u)bct
(22) brt = bxt + byt   bkt
(23) fbft = IfbIft + OfbOft
(24) t = Ett+1 + bxt
(25) bRt = t
(26) bNt+1 = (mig=(1 mig))dmigt+1
(27) byt = cybct + iybit + vybvt + gybgt
Exogenous Processes
(a) dmigt+1 = m dmigt + migt+1
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is set equal to 2/3, and the participation rate is equal to 1   l = 0:62. The bargaining
power of rms is set to 0:4, based on the estimates by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
We use the Hosios (1990) condition to pin down the matching elasticity, so  = #.
The unemployment benets ben and the average cost of hiring a worker  are chosen
to hit the target of 40 percent and 4.5 percent of the average quarterly wage of employed
workers following Shimer (2005), and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) respectively.
Table 3.2: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
m 0.0057/4 steady state immigration rate
u=(n+ u) 0.055 total unemployment rate
uO=u 0.16 share of outsiders in total unemployment
h 0.83 aggregate job nding rate
f 2/3 aggregate vacancy lling rate
1  l 0.62 participation rate
# 0.4 relative bargaining power
 0.4 elasticity of matching
ben=w 0.4 replacement rate
k=w 0.045 cost of vacancies as a % real wage
 0.99 discount factor
' 0.3 capital share
 0.01 capital depreciation rate
 4 elasticity of labor supply
 2 inverse of IES
! 2 capital adjustment cost
x = =(  1) 1.2 gross steady state markup
p 0.75 degree of price stickiness
g=y 0.18 gov cons to GDP ratio
 1.5 Taylor rule coecient on ination
3.3.2 The Eects of Immigration Shocks
Figure 3.4 displays the short-run dynamics of twelve macroeconomic variables (output,
consumption, capital, employment, insider unemployment, outsider unemployment, total
unemployment, real wage, vacancy, labor share, bargaining power of rms, and immi-
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gration) predicted by the benchmark model in response to an immigration shock which
corresponds to an increase of 20 percent in migt+1 in equation (a) in Table 3.1. There is
no change in the bargaining power of rms since it is assumed to be constant in the
baseline model. The gure shows that an immigration shock generates an instantaneous
rise in outsider unemployment as we assume, which leads to a fall in the job nding rate
for outsiders (not shown). According to (3.21), real wage is expected to decline reect-
ing the decline in job nding rate for outsiders, which creates an incentive for rms to
post more job vacancies, since the marginal benet of positing vacancies, and hence, the
value of lling a vacancy increase. It is insiders that get the extra jobs, and hence, the
unemployment rate of insiders decreases. As a result, both employment and the total
unemployment increase. At the same time, an increase in immigration, or equivalently,
an increase in population, will cause a reduction in private capital per person (which is
called a \capital dilution eect"). Households reduce consumption and save more in order
to increase investment and rebuild capital. As a consequence of the decrease in capital
dominating the increase in employment, output gradually decreases after a temporary
rise. Labor share decreases on the impact and reaches its lowest value about half a year
after the shock.
We now turn to see the long-run dynamics in response to the same shock as above.
As is emphasized by Uhlig (2010) in the context of eects of government spending, the
long-run dynamics can be substantially dierent from the short-run dynamics. Figure
3.5 shows the eects of the same immigration shock over the 20 years rather than 5
years. In our model, the long-run impulse responses are qualitatively the same as those
in the short run. What should be emphasized here is that immigration shocks have more
persistent eects on capital, i.e., capital dilution eect is long-lasting, leading to prolonged
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic Responses to an Immigration Shock: Benchmark (5 Years)
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declines in consumption and output, while labor market variables such as employment
and unemployment go back to the steady states as immigration shocks die away 10 years
after the shock. In contrast with the results of VARs, labor share return to its steady-state
value quickly.
3.3.3 The Eects of Immigration Shocks with Bargaining Power Shock
Next, we assume that an increase in immigration will reduce the bargaining power of
workers. In reality, the direction of causality between immigration and bargaining power
could go both ways. For example, immigration could cause a fall in the bargaining power
of workers since immigrant workers are harder to organize into a union. However, the
direction of causality could be reversed. This is because a fall in workers' bargaining power
could worsen the working conditions of jobs which native workers abandon. Immigrant
labor might be increased to ll the vacancies. We do not argue the causality between
them and just assume these shocks are correlated with each other. In this setting, the
bargaining power for rms, #, is no longer constant, and the log-linearized Nash wage
equation is now replaced by:
w bwt =(1  #)(1  ')y
e
(bxt + byt   bet)  # h(1  ')xy
e
  c(l    u)
i b#t
  #cl blt   #cubut + #c(l    u)bct: (3.22)
A smaller bargaining power of workers, i.e., a larger value of #, means that the workers
receive a smaller share of the surplus, and hence a smaller wage.
The green lines in Figure 3.6 plot the responses in the case where a bargaining shock of
1% occurs simultaneously with the same immigration shock as before. For reference, the
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Figure 3.5: Dynamic Responses to an Immigration Shock: Benchmark (20 Years)
0 10 20
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Output
0 10 20
−0.2
−0.1
0
Consumption
0 10 20
−0.2
−0.1
0
Capital
0 10 20
−0.05
0
0.05
Employment
0 10 20
−2
−1
0
1
Insider Unemp.
0 10 20
0
5
10
Total Outsider Unemp.
0 10 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
Total Unemp.
0 10 20
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
Real Wage
0 10 20
−2
0
2
4
Vacancy
0 10 20
−0.1
0
0.1
Labor Share
Years
0 10 20
−1
0
1
Firms Barg. Power
Years
0 10 20
0
10
20
Immigration
Years
77
responses following an immigration shock only (the baseline) are also shown. As is clear
from the gure, the decline in the real wage is amplied in the presence of a bargaining
shock, and more vacancies are created. As a consequence, insider unemployment declines
and employment increases by a larger amount, leading to an increase in output. Note
also that changes in bargaining power and immigration generate a larger decline in labor
share.
We next study how the degree of persistence of bargaining power shocks aects our
results. The darker green lines in Figure 3.7 displays the responses to an AR(2) bargaining
shock with an immigration shock. That persistent bargaining shock causes a delayed
response for real wage, and hence labor share, which is close to the empirical response.
3.3.4 The Eects of an Immigration Shock with Rigid Wages
The literature emphasizes the need for the wage rigidity to explain the cyclical behavior of
unemployment and vacancies in the search and matching model. For example, Hall (2005)
showed how wage stickiness allows labor market frictions model to explain unemployment
variability. Uhlig (2007) showed how real wage rigidity can allow macro models to explain
asset market behavior. Blanchard and Gal (2007) have shown how real wage rigidity can
allow the New Keynesian model to account for ination and unemployment dynamics.
The wage rigidity may also play an important role for explaining the recent decline in labor
share, coupled with immigration shock. Here, we introduce a simple wage rigidity rule
to the benchmark model following Shimer (2010). The wage is expressed as a weighted
average of the wage in the previous period and Nash bargained wage in this period:
wt = 
wwt 1 + (1  w)wNasht (3.23)
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Figure 3.6: Dynamic Responses to an Immigration Shock with a Bargaining Shock
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Figure 3.7: Dynamic Responses to Immigration Shocks with an AR(2) Bargaining Shock
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where w 2 [0; 1] denotes the degree of wage stickiness and wNasht is a Nash bargained
wage given by (3.21). When w = 0, wages are exible, and therefore, the model corre-
sponds to the benchmark one.
Figure 3.8 plots the impulse responses following a shock to immigration in the presence
of the wage rigidity for alternative parameter for wage rigidity, w = 0 (baseline), 0:5, or
0:9. No bargaining shock occurred here. Figure 3.9 shows the responses to an immigration
and a bargaining power shock with wage rigidity.
According to Figure 3.8, the presence of wage rigidity leads to more gradual declines
in real wages, and in turn, less increases in job vacancies. Consequently, unemployment
of insiders is higher, and employment and output are lower than those in the baseline
model.
As shown in Figure 3.9, the dierence in responses of real wages in the case with the
mild wage rigidity (w = 0:5) and an AR(2) bargaining shock, and the case without them
lies in the impact eects. After that they show similar responses.
3.4 Extension
In this section, we extend the baseline model in two ways by changing the assumption of
treating immigrants as outsiders. First, we assume that immigrants enter a host economy
with jobs. Next, we assume that immigrants enter as insiders.
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Figure 3.8: Dynamic Responses to an Immigration Shock with Rigid Wages
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Figure 3.9: Dynamic Responses to Immigration Shock with Rigid Wages and Bargaining
Shock
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3.4.1 Immigration with Jobs
If we consider an increase in immigration as an exogenous shock to the number of employed
workers, then the transition of equation for employed workers is rewritten as
Et+1 = (1  )Et + (1  1)Migt +M It +MOt
, et+1 = (1  )et + (1  1)migt +mIt +mOt (3.24)
where 1 2 (0; 1) is the exogenous job separation rate. We assume that immigrants be-
come outsiders when their jobs are terminated. The rst-order conditions for household's
problem are unaected to this change. The Cobb-Douglas production function is now
given by
Yt = K
'
t (Et +Migt)
1 ': (3.25)
Thus, the marginal product of labor now becomes;
MPLt :=
@Yt
@Et
= (1  ') Yt
Et +Migt
= (1  ') yt
et +migt
(3.26)
Note that an increase in immigration leads to a fall in the marginal product of labor if
other things are equal. The resulting optimal vacancy posting condition is

ft
= Et

ct
ct+1
 "
(1  ') yt+1
et+1 +migt+1
  wt+1 + (1  ) 
ft+1
#
; (3.27)
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and Nash bargained wage is
wt = (1  #)
"
(1  ')xt yt
et +migt
+
Oht
ft
#
+ #ben  #ct EtVUIt : (3.28)
An increase in employed immigration has two counteracting eects on job vacancies. On
one hand, it creates more incentives for rms to post vacancies by reducing the marginal
product of labor, and hence, wage. On the other hand, the decrease in the marginal
product of labor caused by employed immigration creates less incentive to open vacancies
by reducing the marginal benet of posting them.
The corresponding log-linearized equations are now given by
bet+1 =1  
N
bet +  mig
e N
dmigt +  mIe N
 bmIt +  mOe N
 bmOt ;
byt ='bkt + (1  ')  e
e+mig
bet + mig
e+mig
dmigt ;

f
bft + f bct = f Etbct+1 + (1  ') ye+migEt

e
e+mig
bet + mig
e+mig
dmigt  bxt+1   byt+1
+ wEt bwt+1 + (1  ) 
f
Etbft+1;
w bwt =(1  #)(1  ')x y
e+mig
bxt + byt    e
e+mig
bet + mig
e+mig
dmigt
  #cl blt   #cubut + #c(l    u)bct:
Figure 3.10 displays impulse responses to an immigration shock of the same magni-
tude as the baseline, but now immigrants are assumed to enter as employed workers. This
employed immigration shock leads to a fall in real wages, which is similar to the prediction
of the baseline model of outsider-immigrants. However, the model with employed immi-
grants predicts a decrease in job vacancies, while the model with outsider-immigrants
predicts the opposite. In the baseline model, as explained in Subsection 3.3.2, the main
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reason why an immigration shock increases job vacancies is that it causes the job nding
rate for outsiders to fall, which leads to negative pressure on real wage and a positive
pressure on vacancies. In the model with employed immigration, the eect of a reduction
in the marginal benet of posting a vacancy, due to a fall in the marginal product of
labor, dominates the eect of an increase in the marginal benet due to a fall in real
wages, and as a result of that, job vacancies decrease. This reduction of vacancies makes
it harder for insiders to nd jobs, and hence, unemployment of insiders increases. Un-
employment of outsiders also increases on the impact. This is because non-participants
reduces leisure and enter the labor market in order to increase consumption. However, it
becomes slightly below the steady state by reecting the fact they leave the labor market
and become non-participants. As a consequence, the model with employed immigration
generates slightly larger impacts on total employment and output. The responses of con-
sumption and capital are similar between the two models. Labor share decreases more
on the impact.
3.4.2 Immigration as Insiders
Next, we turn to the case where immigrants enter a host economy as insiders. In this
case, the matching function for insiders is now given by
M It = 
I
mV

t [(u
I
t +migt)Nt]
1 ; (3.29)
and hence, the job nding rate for insiders is
Ih =
M It
(uIt +migt)Nt
=
mIt
uIt +migt
: (3.30)
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Figure 3.10: Immigration with Employment
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The law of motion for insiders is replaced by
U It+1 = (1  )U It + Et  M It + (1  2)Migt
, euIt+1 = (1  )uIt + et   Iht uIt + (1  2)migt (3.31)
where 2 2 (0; 1) is the probability that immigrants become outsiders.
As a result, the corresponding log-linearized equations are now replaced by
bmIt =  bvt + (1  )  uIuI +mig buIt + miguI +mig dmigt

;
bIht = bmIt   uIuI +mig buIt   miguI +mig dmigt;
beuIt+1 = 1  N
 buIt +  euIN
bet    mI
uIN
 bmIt + (1  2) miguIN
dmigt:
Figure 3.11 shows the dynamic responses to an immigration shock with the assumption
that immigrants enter a host economy as insiders. The magnitude of the shock is the
same as the baseline model. For comparison, the responses of the baseline model are also
displayed. An increase in immigration generates an increase in unemployment of insiders
as we have assumed. On impact, real wages fall due to a fall in the marginal value
of being an insider, leading to an instantaneous rise in vacancies. After that, however,
vacancies show a gradual decrease and become slightly below the steady state level since
the marginal cost of a vacancy increases gradually due to a fall in the vacancy lling
rate (not shown). Unemployment of outsiders also declines gradually just after an initial
rise, reecting the fact that the job nding rate for outsiders declines since some of them
leave the labor market. Less increase in vacancies leads to less increase in employment,
and hence, less output. Again, the responses of consumption and capital to the shock
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are unaected by changing the assumption on how immigrants enter an economy. Labor
share decreases on impact and soon goes back to the steady state.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the macroeconomic eects of immigration on labor market dy-
namics using a New Keynesian model with labor market search and heterogeneous unem-
ployed workers. The structure of the model enables us to study the dierent hypotheses
on how immigrations enter a host country. We nd that, when they enter as outsiders
and reduce the bargaining power of workers, the labor share of national income shows
a hump-shaped decline, which is in line with empirical evidence produced by a VAR
analysis. This suggests the importance of the role of the worker's bargaining power in
investigating the dynamic macroeconomic impacts of immigration, to which no role is
given in the standard New Keynesian model.
We also nd that the reduction in wages caused by an outsider-immigration creates
incentive for rms to post more vacancies, so the unemployment of insiders declines, i.e.,
an outsider-immigration shock is bad for outsiders and benecial to insiders in terms
of unemployment. When immigrants enter as employed workers, it generates a fall in
the marginal product of labor, which has a negative eect on wage and vacancies, and
hence, workers lose out in terms of wages and insiders lose out in terms of unemployment.
Unemployment of outsiders falls gradually since they leave the labor market and enjoy
leisure. Lastly, when immigrants enter as insiders, they are bad for insiders in terms of
unemployment and workers in terms of wages, while they are good for outsiders in terms
of unemployment. To sum up, immigration adversely eects, or directly competes with,
the sector immigrants enter, but benets other sector(s).
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Figure 3.11: Immigration as Insiders
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There are some signicant issues for future research. One issue to be pursued in fu-
ture work is to take into account the dierence in wages between matched insiders and
outsiders. In the model we have used above, the wages paid to matched insiders are
the same as the wages paid to matched outsiders. Considering the equilibrium wage gap
between inside and outside workers makes our model more realistic and may have impor-
tant implications for the design of immigration policies. Another issue to be considered is
to incorporate a constant elasticity of the substitution (CES) production function where
migrant labor is a substitute for capital but a complement to domestic labor, which al-
lows for an analysis of the impacts of immigration when capital-skill complementarity is
present. These would be fruitful for future research.
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1 Log-linearizing around the Steady State
This appendix presents the details of how we derived the rst-order conditions. We then
gives the details of the derivations of log-linearized equations of the model as well as the
steady state conditions in terms of per-capita variables.
B.2 Derivations of the First-Order Conditions
B.2.1 Household's Problem
The household's problem is expressed as
J (kt; et; uIt ; bt) = max
ct;kt+1;bt+1;et+1;uIt+1;u
O
t
 
c1 t
1   +
l1 t
1  
!
Nt
+ EtJ (kt+1; et+1; uIt+1; bt+1)
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subject to
ctNt + itNt +
bt+1Nt+1
ptRt
 rtktNt + wtetNt + ben(uIt + uOt +migt)Nt +
btNt
pt
+ protNt   ttNt;
kt+1Nt+1 = (1  )ktNt + itNt   !
2

kt+1Nt+1
ktNt
  N
2
ktNt;
1 = et + u
I
t + u
O
t +migt + lt
et+1Nt+1 = (1  )etNt +M It +MOt ;
uIt+1Nt+1 = (1  )uItNt + etNt  M It ;
M It = 
Ih
t u
I
tNt;
MOt = 
Oh
t (u
O
t +migt)Nt:
The household's problem can be rewritten as
J (kt; et; uIt ; bt) = max
ct;kt+1;bt+1;et+1;uIt+1;u
O
t
 
c1 t
1   +
(1  et   uIt   uOt  migt)1 
1  
!
Nt
+EtJ (kt+1; et+1; uIt+1; bt+1)
 ct

ctNt + kt+1Nt+1   (1  )ktNt + !
2

kt+1Nt+1
ktNt
  N
2
ktNt +
bt+1Nt+1
ptRt
 rtktNt   wtetNt   ben(uIt + uOt +migt)Nt  
btNt
pt
  protNt + ttNt

+et((1  )etNt + Iht uItNt + Oht (uOt +migt)Nt   et+1Nt+1)
+ut((1  )uItNt + etNt   Iht uItNt   uIt+1Nt+1):
(B.1)
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The rst-order conditions are:
[ct] : c
 
t Nt   ctNt = 0
[kt+1] :   ctNt+1

1 + !

kt+1Nt+1
ktNt
  N

+ EtJk;t+1 = 0
[bt+1] :  ctNt+1
ptRt
+ EtJb;t+1 = 0
[et+1] : EtJe;t+1   etNt+1 = 0 (B.2)
[uIt+1] : EtJuI ;t+1   utNt+1 = 0 (B.3)
[uOt ] :   l t Nt + ctbenNt + ntOht Nt = 0:
Next we derive the rst derivatives of J dened above. Dierentiating (B.1) with respect
to kt, bt, et, and u
I
t :
Jk;t = ct
 
(1  ) + rt +
"
!

kt+1Nt+1
ktNt
  N

kt+1Nt+1
ktNt

  !
2

kt+1Nt+1
ktNt
  N
2#!
Nt
= ct
 
(1  ) + rt + !
2
"
kt+1Nt+1
ktNt
2
  (N )2
#!
Nt
Jb;t = ctNt
pt
Je;t = ( l t + ctwt + (1  )et + ut)Nt
JuI ;t = ( l t + ctben+ Iht et + ((1  )  Iht )ut)Nt
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Forwarding these expressions one period:
Jk;t+1 = ct+1
 
(1  ) + rt+1 + !
2
"
kt+2Nt+2
kt+1Nt+1
2
  (N )2
#!
Nt+1
Jb;t+1 = ct+1Nt+1
pt+1
Je;t+1 = ( l t+1 + ct+1wt+1 + (1  )et+1 + ut+1)Nt+1
JuI ;t+1 = ( l t+1 + ct+1ben+ Iht+1et+1 + ((1  )  Iht+1)ut+1)Nt+1:
Thus, substituting these expressions into the rst-order conditions, we get:
[ct] : c
 
t = ct
[kt+1] : ct

1 + !

kt+1Nt+1
ktNt
  N

= Etct+1
 
(1  ) + rt+1 + !
2
"
kt+2Nt+2
kt+1Nt+1
2
  (N )2
#!
[bt+1] : ct
Nt+1
ptRt
= Etct+1
Nt+1
pt+1
, 1 = Et

ct+1
ct

pt
pt+1

Rt
[et+1] : et = Et[ct+1wt+1 + (1  )et+1 + ut+1   l t+1]
[uIt+1] : ut = Et[ct+1ben+ Iht+1 + ((1  )  Iht+1)ut+1   l t+1]
[uOt ] : et =
l t   ctben
Oht
: (B.4)
B.2.2 Value Denitions
We dene the marginal value to the household of having one member employed as follows:
VEt := Je;t = ( l t + ctwt + (1  )et + ut)Nt (B.5)
VUIt := JuI ;t = ( l t + ctben+ Iht et + ((1  )  Iht )ut)Nt (B.6)
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By dening next-period value of employment and insider-unemployment as
VEt+1 :=Je;t+1
VUIt+1 :=JuI ;t+1
and using the rst-order conditions for et+1 (B.2) , u
O
t (B.4), and u
I
t+1 (B.3), we have
etNt+1 =EtVEt+1
, et =Et
VEt+1
Nt+1
=
l t   ctben
Ot
(B.7)
and
utNt+1 =EtVUIt+1 (B.8)
Thus, eliminating et and ut from (B.5) and (B.6),
VEt =
"
 l t + c t wt + (1  )Et
VEt+1
Nt+1
+ Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
#
Nt (B.9)
VUIt =
"
 l t + c t ben+ Iht Et
VEt+1
Nt+1
+ ((1  )  Iht )Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
#
Nt: (B.10)
B.2.3 Firm's Problem
The value function of a rm with Et currently employed workers is:
V(Et) = max
Kt;Vt
xtF (Kt; Et)  wtEt   rtKt   Vt + Ett+1V((1  )Et + ft Vt): (B.11)
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The rst-order conditions are:
[Kt] : xtFKt   rt = 0, 'xt Yt
Kt
= rt
[Vt] :   + Ett+1VE;t+1ft = 0
, 
ft
= Ett+1VE;t+1: (B.12)
Next, we derive the rst derivative of V with respect to Et+1, i.e., VE;t+1. Substituting
the optimal value of vacancy, which is denoted by V t (Et), into (B.11) gives
V(Et) = xtF (Kt; Et)  wtEt   rtKt   V t (Et) + Ett+1V((1  )Et + ft V t (Et))
Dierentiate with respect to Et gives
VE;t = xtFEt   wt   V 0t (Et) + Ett+1VE;t+1| {z }
==ft from FOC
((1  ) + ft V 
0
t (Et))
= xtFEt   wt   V 0t (Et) + (1  )

ft
+ V 
0
t (Et)
= xtFEt   wt + (1  ) 
ft
(B.13)
Forwarding the last expression one period
VE;t+1 = xt+1FE;t+1   wt+1 + (1  ) 
ft+1
(B.14)
By substituting (B.14) into (B.12), the rst-order condition for vt is now given by

ft
= Et

ct
ct+1
 "
xt+1FEt+1   wt+1 + (1  ) 
ft+1
#
;
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where we use t+1 = uct+1=uct = (ct=ct+1)
.
B.2.4 Value Denitions
From (B.13), the marginal value to the rm of lling a vacancy is
VFt :=
@V(Et)
@Et| {z }
=VE;t
@Et
@et|{z}
=Nt
=
"
(1  ')xt Yt
Et
  wt + (1  ) 
ft
#
Nt; (B.15)
where we use Et = etNt and FEt = (1   ')xt YtEt . Thus, the rst-order condition for
vacancy, (B.12), is now given by

ft
= Et

ct
ct+1
 VFt+1
Nt+1
: (B.16)
B.2.5 Bargaining over Wages
The Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
wt
(1  #) lnVEt + # lnVFt
where VEt and VFt are dened in (B.9) and (B.15) respectively. The rst-order condition
with respect to wt is
0 =(1  #)c
 
t Nt
VEt
+ #
 Nt
VFt
, #VEt =(1  #)c t VFt (B.17)
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Forwarding (B.17) one period and taking expectations at period t gives
#EtVEt+1 =(1  #)Etc t+1VFt+1
Multiplying both sides by ct =Nt+1
#ctEt
VEt+1
Nt+1
=(1  #)Et

ct
ct+1
 VFt+1
Nt+1| {z }
==ft by (B.16)
#ct Et
VEt+1
Nt+1| {z }
(B.7)
= (1  #) 
ft
(B.18)
#ct
 
l t   c t ben
Oht
!
= (1  #) 
ft
#ctl
 
t = #ben+ (1  #)
Oht
ft
: (B.19)
Multiplying the denition of the marginal value of employment, (B.9), by #tc

t ;
#ctV
E
t = #c

t
"
c t wt   l t ++(1  )Et
VEt+1
Nt+1
+ Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
#
Nt
=
26664#wt   #ctl t| {z }
(B:19)
+(1  )#ct Et
VEt+1
Nt+1| {z }
(B:18)
+#ct Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
37775Nt
=
"
#wt  
"
#ben+ (1  #)
Oh
t
ft
#
+ (1  )(1  #) 
ft
+ #ct Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
#
Nt
=
"
#wt   #tben+ (1  #t) 
ft

 Oht + 1  

+ #tc

t Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
#
Nt: (B.20)
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Therefore, by rewiring (B.17) using (B.20) and (B.15), we can derive the following optimal
wage:
#ctV
E
t = (1  #)VFt
,
"
#wt   #ben+ (1  #) 
ft

 Oht + 1  

+ #ct Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
#
Nt
= (1  #)
"
(1  ') Yt
Et
  wt + (1  ) 
ft
#
Nt
, wt = (1  #)
"
(1  ')yt
et
+ [Oht   (1  ) + (1  )]

ft
#
+ #benNt   #ct Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
, wt = (1  #)
"
(1  ')yt
et
+
Oht
ft
#
+ #ben  #ct Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
B.3 Derivations of Log-linearized Equations
We log-linearize the equations around the steady state. Hats over variables denote log-
deviations from the steady-state values. The per-capita variables are dened so that
ct = Ct=Nt. For notational ease, we also dene three variables;
ekt = Kt
Nt 1
; et = Et
Nt 1
; euIt = U ItNt 1 :
Thus, ekt, et and euIt are not adjusted for the increase in population. Note that
ekt = Kt
Nt
Nt
Nt 1
= kt
N
t
or
ekt+1Nt = Kt+1
Nt
Nt =
Kt+1
Nt+1
Nt+1 = kt+1Nt+1
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B.3.1 Law of Motion for Employment
Dividing et+1Nt = (1  )etNt +M It +MOt by Nt gives:
et+1 = (1  )et +mIt +mOt
e (1 + bet+1) = (1  )e (1 + bet) +mI(1 + bmIt ) +mO(1 + bmOt )
e bet+1 = (1  )e bet +mI bmIt +mO bmOt
bet+1 = (1  )ee bet +

mIe
 bmIt + mOe
 bmOt
=

1  
N
bet +  mI
e N
 bmIt +  mOe N
 bmOt
since
ee = E=NE=N 1 = N 1N = 1N
and
mIe = M I=NE=N 1 = M
I
E
N 1
N
=
mI
e
1
N
:
At the steady state:
e= (1  )e+mI +mO
B.3.2 Adjusted Employment per Person
et =
Et
Nt
=
Et
Nt 1
Nt 1
Nt
=
et
Nt
, bet = bet   bNt
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B.3.3 Matching Function for Insiders
M It = 
I
mV

t (u
I
tNt)
1  , mIt = Imvt (uIt )1  , bmIt = bvt + (1  )buIt
B.3.4 Matching Function for Outsiders
MOt = 
O
mV

t ((u
O
t +migt)Nt)
1 
, mOt = Omvt (uOt +migt)1 
, bmOt =  bvt + (1  )  uOuO +mig buOt + miguO +mig dmigt

B.3.5 Job Finding Rate for Insiders
Iht =
M It
uItNt
=
mIt
uIt
, bIht = bmIt   buIt
B.3.6 Job Finding Rate for Outsiders
Oht =
MOt
(uOt +migt)Nt
=
mOt
uOt +migt
, bOht =bmOt   uOuO +mig buOt   miguO +mig dmigt
B.3.7 Private Capital Accumulation
ekt+1 = (1  )kt + it   !
2
 ekt+1
kt
  N
!2
kt
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At the steady state:
kN = (1  )k + i, i
kN
= 1  1  
N
Log-linearizing gives
bekt+1 = 1  
N
bkt + 1  1  
N
bit
since the adjustment cost is equal to zero when log-linearizing.
B.3.8 Adjusted Capital per Person
kt =
Kt
Nt
=
Kt
Nt 1
Nt 1
Nt
=
ekt
Nt
, bkt = bekt   bNt
B.3.9 Law of Motion for Insider Unemployment
euIt+1 = (1  ) uIt +  et  mIt
At the steady state:
euI = (1  ) uI +  e  Ih uI
, euI   (1  ) uI =  e  Ih uI
, (N   1 + ) euI =  e  Ih uI
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Log-linearizing
euI(1 + beuIt+1) = (1  ) uI(1 + buIt ) + e (1 + bet) mI(1 + bmIt )
beuIt+1 = (1  )uIeuI
 buIt +   eeuI  bet  

mIeuI
 bmIt
=

1  
N
 buIt +  euIN
bet    mI
uIN
 bmIt
where we use the fact that uI=euI = 1=N
B.3.10 Adjusted Insider Unemployment per Person
uIt =
U It
Nt
=
U It
Nt 1
Nt 1
Nt
=
euIt
Nt
, buIt = beuIt   bNt
B.3.11 Total Population
1 = et + u
I
t + u
O
t +migt + lt
, 0 = ebet + uIbuIt + uO buOt +mig dmigt + lblt
B.3.12 FOC for Capital Holding
c t

1 + !

kt+1Nt+1
ktNt
  N

= Etc t+1
 
1   + rt+1 + !
2
"
kt+2Nt+2
kt+1Nt+1
2
  (N )2
#!
, c t
 
1 + !
"ekt+1
kt
  N
#!
= Etc t+1
0@1   + rt+1 + !
2
24 ekt+2
kt+1
!2
  (N )2
351A
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At the steady state
c  = c (1   + r), 1

= 1   + r
Log-linearizing
LHS =c e bct

1 + !

N exp(
bekt+1   bkt)  N
=c (1  bct)1 + !N bekt+1   bkt
=c 

1 + !N
bekt+1   bkt  bct
RHS =Etc  exp( bct+1)1   + rebrt+1 + !
2
(N )2

exp(2
bekt+2   2bkt+1)  1
=c Et(1  bct+1)
0B@(1   + r)| {z }
=1=
+rbrt+1 + !
2
(N )2[2
bekt+2   2bkt+1]
1CA
=c Et

1

+ rbrt+1 + !(N )2(bekt+2   bkt+1)  

bct+1
=c Et

1 + rbrt+1 + !(N )2(bekt+2   bkt+1)  bct+1
Combining gives
c (1 + !N [bekt+1   bkt]  bct) = c Et 1 + rbrt+1 + !(N )2(bbkt+2   bkt+1)  bct+1
!N (
bekt+1   bkt)  bct = Et rbrt+1 + !(N )2(bekt+2   bkt+1)  bct+1
 bct   !Nbkt = Et[ bct+1 + rbrt+1 + !(N )2bekt+2   wNbekt+1   !(N )2bkt+1]


bct + !N

bkt = Et  

bct+1   rbrt+1   !(N )2bekt+2 + wN

bekt+1 + !(N )2bkt+1
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B.3.13 FOC for Outsider Unemployment
et =
l t   c t ben
Oht
, Ohe(1 + bOht + bet) = l (1  blt)  c ben(1  bct)
, Ohe(bOht + bet) =  l blt + c benbct
or using the steady-state relationship l  = Ohe + c ben
Ohe
Ohe + c ben
(bOht + bet)  c benOhe + c benbct =  blt
B.3.14 Value of Unemployment
ut = Et[c t+1ben+ 
Ih
t+1nt+1 + ((1  )  Iht+1)ut+1   l t+1]
At the steady state
u = [c
 ben+ Ihe + ((1  )  Ih)u   l  ]
Log-linearizing
u(1 + but) = Et[c ben(1  bct+1) + Ihe(1 + bIht+1 + bet+1)
+ (1  )u(1 + but+1)  Ihu(1 + bIht+1 + but+1)  l (1  blt+1)]
ubut = Et[ c benbct+1 + Ihebet+1 + u[(1  )  Ih]but+1
+ Ih[e   u]bIht+1 +l blt+1]
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B.3.15 Value of Employment
et = Et[c t+1wt+1 + (1  )et+1 + ut+1   l t+1]
Log-linearizing
e(1 + bet) =Et[c w(1  bct+1 + bwt+1) + (1  )e(1 + bet+1) + u(1 + but+1)
  l (1  blt+1)]
, ebet =Et[ c wbct+1 + c w bwt+1 + (1  )ebet+1 + ubut+1 +l blt+1]
B.3.16 Return on Bond
1 = Et



ct
ct+1
  pt
pt+1

Rt

At the steady state:
1 = R, R = 1=
Log-linearizing
bct = Etbct+1   1

( bRt   Etbt+1)
B.3.17 Production Function
Yt = K
'
t E
1 '
t , yt = k't e1 't , byt = 'bkt + (1  ')bet
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B.3.18 Vacancy Filling Rate for Insiders
Ift =
M It
Vt
=
mIt
vt
, bIft = bmIt   bvt
B.3.19 Vacancy Filling Rate for Outsiders
Oft =
MOt
Vt
=
mOt
vt
, bOft = bmOt   bvt
B.3.20 Job Creation

ft
= Et

ct
ct+1
 "
(1  ')xt yt
et
  wt+1 + (1  ) 
ft+1
#
At the steady state:

ft
= 

(1  ')y
e
  w + (1  ) 
f

, 
ft
(1  (1  )) = 
h
(1  ')y
e
  w
i
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Log-linearizing

f
(1  bft ) =Et(1 + (bct   bct+1))
(1  ')xy
e
(1 + bxt+1 + byt+1   bet+1)  w(1 + bwt+1) + (1  ) 
f
(1  bft+1)
=Et(1 + (bct   bct+1))

f
+ (1  ')xy
e
(bxt+1 + byt+1   bet+1)  w bwt+1   (1  ) 
f
bft+1
=Et
"

f
+ (1  ')xy
e
(bxt+1 + byt+1   bet+1)  w bwt+1   (1  ) 
f
bft+1
+

f
(bct   bct+1)#

f
bft + f bct = f Etbct+1 + (1  ')xyeEt(bet+1   bxt+1   byt+1) + wEt bwt+1 + (1  ) f Etbft+1:
B.3.21 Nash Wage Equation
wt = (1  #)
"
(1  ')xt yt
et
+
Oht
ft
#
+ #ben  #ct Et
VUIt+1
Nt+1
: (B.21)
At the steady state:
w = (1  #)

(1  ')xy
e
+
Oh
f

+ #ben  #cut;
where we use utNt+1 = EtVUIt+1 from (B.8). Substituting (B.19) into (B.21) and log-
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linearizing gives
wt =(1  #t)(1  ')xt yt
et
+ (1  #t)
Oh
t
ft
+ #tb| {z }
=#tc

tl
 
t
 #tct ut
w(1 + bwt) =(1  #)(1  ')y
e
(1 + bxt + byt   bet) + #cl (1 + b#t + bct   blt)
  #cu(1 + b#t + bct + but)
w bwt =(1  #)(1  ')xy
e
(bxt + byt   bet)
  #cl blt   #cubut + #c(l    u)bct:
B.3.22 Capital Rental Rate
rt = 'xt
Yt
Kt
= 'xt
yt
kt
, brt = bxt + byt   bkt
B.3.23 Resource Constraint
Yt = Ct + It + Vt +Gt
yt = ct + it + vt + gt
byt = c
y
bct + i
y
bit + v
y
bvt + g
y
bgt
B.3.24 Aggregate Vacancy Filling Rate
ft = 
If
t + 
Of
t , fbft = IfbIft + OfbOft
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B.3.25 Monetary Policy
Rt = R exp(t)
, logRt = logR+ t , bRt = t
B.2.26 Growth of Population
Nt+1
Nt
= Nt+1 =
1
1 migt+1 :
Log-linearizing this expression, it is easy to dene a new variable ft := 1 migt+1. Thus,
Nt+1 = 
N exp (bNt+1) = f 1 exp (  bft), hence bNt+1 =   bft. Now log-linearize ft gives:
f(1 + bft+1) = 1 mig(1 + dmigt+1)
, bft+1 =  mig
f
dmigt+1 =   mig1 migdmigt+1
, bNt+1 = mig1 migdmigt+1:
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Chapter 4
Mitigating Fiscal Crisis through
Population Growth
4.1 Introduction
The recent increases in the debt to GDP ratio in many developed countries, especially after
the nancial crisis in 2008, have led to a great deal of debate about scal consolidation
polices, i.e., how best to reduce the level of debt in an economy. The accumulated public
debt is considered to be problematic since it begins to hamper economic growth when
it exceeds some threshold level{ see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogo (2010) and Checherita-
Westphal and Rother (2012). Thus, much public and academic attention has been paid
to the eects of scal policy and the size of scal multipliers, coupled with the fact that
monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. See
Ramey (2011b) for an overview of the literature on scal policy.
In this paper we analyze one policy whose eects have not received a great deal of
analysis: raising the rate of population growth. It is intuitive that raising the rate of
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population growth will reduce the rate of debt per capita and the debt to GDP ratio,
ceteris paribus, since the number of taxpayers increases. However, an increase in the rate
of population will also reduce the domestic private capitals per person if other things are
equal. This is what is called a \capital dilution eect". This capital dilution eect may
cause a slowdown in the growth of GDP per capita, which in turn potentially may lead
to a rise in the level of debt.
This paper analyzes the eects of such a debt reduction policy using the dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework of Uhlig (2010) and Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011). We show that if the tax revenue from increased population growth is spent
eectively on productive public capital and at the correct time, then population growth
can mitigate the capital dilution without increasing the present value of budget decits.
The analysis in this paper treats population growth simply as a policy parameter
which is open to interpretation. A straightforward interpretation would be that the rate of
population growth in a developed economy can be controlled by the rate of immigration,
which is in the power of government. In Section 2 below we show that the rate of
immigration has been inversely related to the growth rate of the debt to GDP ratio in
the U.S. economy since 1950, and we detail briey the U.S. immigration legislation in the
periods.
In the analysis we treat increased population as identical to all other representative
agents and so increased population growth, e.g., immigrants, makes no extra demands on
government nances. We regard this as a reasonable assumption since the evidence shows
that, if anything, immigrants are net contributors to a government's budget. For example,
Storesletten (2000) uses a calibrated general equilibrium overlapping generations model
to compute the net discounted gain to the U.S. government of one additional average
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immigrant and shows that it is positive. More recent results for the U.K. government
have been obtained by Dustman, Frattini and Halls (2010) and Dustman and Frattini
(2014), and these show that immigrants that arrived since 2000, especially those from
the European Economic Area, have made a signicant net contribution to public nances
using the static approach. This paper focuses on the dynamic approach in the sense that
all future taxes and expenditures are considered in a forward-looking manner using the
concept of the net present value, not focusing on a particular year.
Our paper is most similar to the work by Ben-Gad (2012), which has shown that im-
migration creates an incentive, or a bias, for a current native population to support higher
decits because the cost of nancing them can be partially shifted to future immigrants.
We reverse his argument; government decits create an incentive, a rationale, to admit
more immigrants. The main dierence between our approach and his is that we analyze
adjustments of labor income using a DSGE model where labor supply is endogenized,
while he examines changes in capital income taxes using an overlapping dynasties model
with inelastic labor.
This paper is not meant to explore what caused the crisis, but rather to investigate
whether population growth, or immigration, policies are eective given high level of debts.
To do so, we keep our model simple by introducing an exogenous debt shock, which can
cause a sharp rise in government debt. We assume that a debt shock is exogenous in the
context of our theoretical analysis. One can think that an unexpected rise in government
debt, which can be calculated as the actual rise in debt above its forecast, is an exogenous
debt shock. Another interpretation for a debt shock is that it represents an increase in debt
resulting from revisions of debt statistics as the Greek government experienced during the
recent nancial crisis. Thus, we abstract from nancial sectors and shocks that directly
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aect banks' balance sheets as a source of a crisis. Analyses of such nancial shock can
be found in e.g., Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009), Jermann and
Quadrini (2011), and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey describe the recent evolution
of immigration and debt to GDP ratios in the U.S. economy. Section 3 outlines the model,
emphasizing the departures from Uhlig (2010). Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5
concludes.
4.2 Empirical Background
This section presents the broad trends in the growth of the debt to GDP and immigration
in the U.S. Figure 4.1 shows that until around the end of the 1970's the debt to GDP ratio
fell as the U.S. economy boomed and the level of immigration was low with the share of
foreign born in the U.S. population falling from 5.4% in 1960 to 4.7% in 1970, which is
shown on the right scale in Figure 4.2. Since then the immigration share has kept rising
as a result of generous immigration policies in the U.S. government. For example, the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which is also known as the 1986 Immigration
Amnesty, legalized three million illegal immigrants. Subsequently, the Immigration Act
of 1990 placed more emphasis on employment considerations and increased the number
of highly educated and skilled immigrations. In 2010, immigrants account for 12.9% of
the U.S. population.
This rise in immigration was accompanied by a fall in the growth rate of the debt
to GDP ratio in most years since 1970. There were some exceptions in the 1980's, when
military spending increased in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and in the
2000's, which experienced the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Great Recession
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Figure 4.1: Debt to GDP in the U.S.
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Figure 4.2: Immigrants in the U.S., Number
and Percent
of 2008-2009. Of course this evidence is not proof that the inverse relationship between
growth in the debt to GDP ratio and immigration levels is causal. However the evidence in
Section 3 shows how population growth can help mitigate scal problems and so a political
economy model of immigration quota level setting would be an intuitive extension of this
analysis, although it is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.3 Elements of the Model
We use the model of Uhlig (2010) as a starting point, extending it in three directions.
Firstly and the most importantly, population growth is introduced in the economy. Sec-
ondly, public capital is introduced as a factor of production as in Baxter and King (1993),
Kamps (2004) and Leeper, Walker and Yang (2010). Third, we introduce a debt shock.
An unanticipated shock in debt provides the source of a crisis.
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4.3.1 Population Growth
Our rst departure from Uhlig (2010) is the introduction of population growth. The total
population of the economy, which is denoted by Nt, grows exogenously at a gross rate
Nt+1,
Nt+1 = 
N
t+1Nt; (4.1)
where Nt+1 follows the stationary AR(1) stochastic process:
Nt+1 = N
N
t + 
N
t+1: (4.2)
4.3.2 Representative Household
The innitely-lived representative household maximizes its lifetime utility (4.3) subject
to the budget constraint (4.4) and the capital accumulation equation (4.5). We will use
lower-case letters to denote per capita terms. By the introduction of population growth,
the household's lifetime utility is expressed by multiplying the instantaneous utility of
representative household by the total population of economy. Formally, it is given by
E0
" 1X
t=0
tNt

(ct(lt))
1    1
1  
#
(4.3)
where ct and lt denote consumption and labor per capita respectively, and  is the co-
ecient of relative risk aversion. If we interpret that population growth is caused by
immigration, we regard the immigrants as homogeneous in age and skills and as iden-
tical to natives, and that they start working on entering the economy. Since this is an
innitely-lived agent model, life cycle aspects are abstracted altogether.
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The budget constraint takes the form
(1 +  c)ctNt + xtNt + btNt =R
b
tbt 1Nt 1 + stNt +mtNt
+ (1   lt )wtltNt + (rt   k(rt   ))ktNt (4.4)
where xt is private investment, bt denote government bonds, R
b
t represents the interests
of government bonds purchased in period t  1, st denote transfers from the government,
mt denote transfers from the rest of the world, wt represents wage, rt is capital rental
rate, and kt is private capital. The tax which are levied on consumption, labor income,
and capital income are denoted by  c;  lt , and 
k respectively. Consumption taxes and
capital income taxes are held xed, and thus there are no time subscripts. Capital income
are taxed on net of depreciation  2 [0; 1]. The private capital accumulation equation is
given by
kt+1Nt+1 = [(1  )kt + xt]Nt: (4.5)
4.3.3 Representative Firm
The representative rm produces output in period t, which is denoted by Yt, by combining
aggregate labor Lt, aggregate private capital Kt, and aggregate public capital K
G
t . This
introduction of public capital as a factor of production is the second departure from Uhlig
(2010). The production function takes the form:
Yt = A

tK
1 
t L

t (K
G
t )
G ; (4.6)
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where At is a technology parameter and 
A
t = At=At 1 follows a stationary exogenous
stochastic process. A key parameter in this model is the productiveness of public capital,
G. If it is strictly positive, public capital is productive since it raises marginal product
of private capital and labor. If it is equal to zero, public capital is unproductive. The
rm maximizes prots
Yt   rtKt   wtLt (4.7)
subject to (4.6) taking rt and wt as given.
4.3.4 Government
The government remaining debt before levying labor tax and issuing new bond, which is
denoted by Dt, is written as
1
Dt =Gt + St +R
b
tBt 1    cCt   k(rt   )Kt (4.8)
=Bt + 
l
twtLt; (4.9)
where Gt is aggregate government purchases, and St; Ct and Bt denote aggregate variables
of corresponding per capita variables. Excess debts above steady-state values are paid
back at speed  2 (0; 1] per
 (Dt  AtNtD) =  ltwtLt  AtNt l wL; (4.10)
(1   )(Dt  AtNtD) = Bt  AtNtB;
1We call Dt as \remaining debt" considering it is the stock variable although Uhlig (2010) refers it as
\remaining decit". The budget decit in period t can be dened as the change in government debt in
period t, i.e., Bt  Bt 1.
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where variables without time subscripts denote steady state values of the corresponding
variables. Note that w is the steady state value of wt = At ewt. The choice of labor income
tax,  lt , will also determine the level of debt. That is we only have one degree of freedom
to determine the debt and the tax rate. Thus the adjustment speed,  , is eectively
choosing both  lt and the level of debt. A higher speed adjustment will mean higher labor
taxes and lower debt. Following Kamps (2004), we assume that aggregate government
purchases comprises basic government purchases GBt and government investment I
G
t :
Gt = G
B
t + I
G
t ; (4.11)
where both GBt and I
G
t follow stationary AR(1) stochastic processes. Public capital
accumulates as private capital according to
KGt+1 = (1  G)KGt + IGt (4.12)
where G 2 [0; 1] is the depreciation rate of public capital.
4.3.5 Equilibrium
Market clearing condition in the goods market requires
Ct +Xt +Gt = Yt +Mt;
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for all t. Furthermore, in equilibrium aggregate variables are equal to their per-capita
counterparts multiplied by the total population of the economy.
Yt = ytNt;
Ct = ctNt;
Xt = xtNt;
Kt = ktNt;
...
and so on.
4.3.6 Equilibrium Dynamics
In order to be able to log-linearize around the steady state, we need to detrend variables
on the balanced growth path. Following Uhlig (2010), we will denote log-deviations by
hats so that bct = log(ect)  log(c)  (ect   c)=c where ect := ct=At and c is the steady state
of ect. The exceptions are the labor tax rates,  lt , which is expressed as percentage point
deviations, i.e., b lt =  lt    l, and the debt, dt, government spending and consumption, gt
and gBt , government bond, bt, government transfer, st, are expressed relative to steady
state output, e.g., bdt = (edt d)=y, where asterisk is used to emphasize that it is expressed
relative to output.
The log-linearized dynamics of the model is shown in Table 4.1.2 Equations (1) to
(16) determine 16 endogenous variables: yt; ct; xt; kt;K
G
t ; rt; wt; lt; 
n
t ; R
k
t ; R
b
t ; bt; dt; gt; At
and t. Equations (a) to (e) represent exogenous processes. Two things are worth noting.
First, equation (6) shows that there is a capital dilution eect. An increase in population
2See Section C.3 in Appendix C for the details of derivations.
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growth rate reduces per capita private capital. Next, equation (11) shows that there is a
tax reduction eect. An increase in population growth rate reduce the remaining budget
decits per capita.
4.4 Calibration and Simulation
4.4.1 Parameter Values
In the baseline calibration, we take the period in the model to correspond to a quarter and
use the same parameter values as in Uhlig (2010). The new parameter introduced here
is the productiveness of public capital, G, which is assumed to be 0:2 following Kamps
(2004). The benchmark parameters are displayed in Table 4.2.
4.4.2 Policy Experiments
An Increase in Debt and/or Population Growth
First, we analyze the eects of an unanticipated increase in debt shock and assume that
there is no population growth. Figure 4.3 displays the dynamics of nine macroeconomic
variables (output per capita, labor, capital per capita, consumption per capita, investment
per capita, return on capital, labor tax rate, population growth, and government debt per
capita) in response to a 10 percent increase in debt shock, which is assumed to persist as an
AR(1) process with 0.9 coecient. According to the blue lines in Figure 4.3, government
debts per capita begin to rise quickly following an unanticipated debt shock, leading to
nearly 60 percent higher than the steady-state GDP per capita about ve years after the
shock. These responses of government debts are mimicked by those of labor taxes since
a xed  fraction of higher government debts must be nanced by higher labor taxes as
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Table 4.1: The Log-Linearized Equations of the Model
Uhlig (2010) model with population growth and public capital
Household
(1) bwt = 1!Sblt + 11  l b lt + bct
(2) bt =   bct   (1  ) blt
(3) 0 = Et[bt+1   bt + bRkt+1]
(4) 0 = Et[bt+1   bt + bRbt+1]
(5) bRkt = 1  (1  (1  k)) ~A brt
(6) bkt+1 = 1  ~AN bkt + ~AN bxt   bAt+1   bNt+1
Firm
(7) byt =  blt + (1  ) bkt + G (bkGt + bAt)
(8) bwt = (1  )(bkt   blt) + G (bkGt + bAt)
(9) brt = byt   bkt
(10) bAt+1 = bAt + bAt+1
Government
(11) bdt = bgt + bst + 1~N bbt 1 + b~yN ( bRbt   bAt   bNt )   c cy bct
 k

1     ~
x
y
 bkt   k(1  ) brt + b"dt
(12)  bdt =  b lt +  l ( bwt + blt)
(13) (1   ) bdt = bbt
(14) bgt = bgBt + (IG=y) bIGt
(15) bKGt+1 = 1  ~GA bKGt + ~GA bIGt   bAt+1
Resource Constraint
(16) byt = cy bct + xy bxt + bgt
Exogenous Processes
(a) bt+1 =  bt + t+1
(b) bgBt+1 = B bgBt + Bt+1
(c) bIGt+1 = I bIGt + It+1
(d) bht+1 =  bht + ht+1
(e) b"dt+1 = d b"dt + dt+1
This table shows the equations of the log-linearized version of the model. The asterisk denotes that the
variable is expressed relative to steady state output.
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Table 4.2: Common Parameter Values
Household
Discount rate  = 0:99 Tech. growth rate A = 1:005
Depreciation  = 0:02 Risk Aversion  = 2
Pop. growth N = 1
Firm
Labor share  = 0:62 Productiveness of G = 0:2
Pub.Cap
Government
Consumption tax  c = 0:05 Capital Tax k = 0:36
Labor tax  l = 0:28 Depreciation G = 0:02
Financing speed  = 0:05
Steady State Properties
Consumption-GDP c=y = 0:59 Investment-GDP x=y = 0:27
Gov.spending-GDP g=y = 0:18 Gov.inv.-GDP IG=y = 0:05
Debt-GDP b=y = 0:63 Net imports-GDP m=y = 0:04
Gov.transfer-GDP s=y = 0:07
the debt payment rule (4.10), or (12) in Table 4.1 when log-linearized, shows (we assume
 = 0:05 in the baseline). This sharp increase in labor taxes creates a strong disincentive
to work, which leads the household to reduce labor. Per capita values in output, private
consumption, and private capital also show persistent hump-shaped declines.
Next, we make dierent assumptions on population growth. The green lines in Fig-
ure 4.4 assume population growth, which also follows an AR(1) process, while the blue
lines assume no population growth as before. The green lines show that if a debt shock
is followed by a simultaneous increase in population, it causes stronger capital dilution
eects. The top right panel shows that population growth leads to a reduction in private
capital per capita more than in the absence of population growth. In contrast, the dy-
namic responses of government debts and, hence, those of labor taxes, are nearly identical
under these two cases. That is because tax reduction eects brought about by population
growth are oset by a reduction in labor tax revenues due to a decrease in wages brought
about by a rise in capital-labor ratio. As a consequence, in the case of population growth,
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Figure 4.3: Dynamic Responses to a Debt Shock. Blue lines: no population growth
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stronger capital dilution and smaller tax reduction eects generate larger drops in output
and consumption per capita.
Figure 4.4: Dynamic Responses to Debt Shock. Blue lines: no population growth; green
lines: population growth.
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Even if we change the sizes of the debt shock and the population growth shock, the
result, that population growth does not mitigate capital dilution eects, is unchanged.
Furthermore, even if we change the responses of population growth from AR(1) processes
to AR(2) processes, the result does not dier markedly though there is a slightly larger
tax reduction eect (Figures are not shown here).
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An Increase in Population Growth 10 Years after Shock
We have so far found that a simultaneous increase in population following a debt shock
leads to strong capital dilution. Next, in order to mitigate this dilution eect we change
the timing of the occurrence of population growth. The green lines in Figure 4.5 show
the dynamic responses caused by an increase in population ten years after the same size
of the debt shock as in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.5: Dynamic Responses to Debt Shock. Blue lines: no population growth; green
lines: population growth 10 years later
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As shown in Figure 4.5, changing the timing of population growth aects the dynamics
greatly, especially for private investment per capita, and hence, private capital per capita.
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If the supply of labor increases with population growth, then wages are expected to drop
due to a fall in the capital-labor ratio and, in contrast, return on capital is expected to
rise. Therefore, private investment begins to rise before the actual population growth and
shows larger positive responses. As a result, private capital falls less during the initial
years and even becomes positive until the dilution eects occur. The timing of population
growth also matters for the responses of labor taxes and, hence, labor. When population
growth occurs ten years after the shock, labor taxes begin to fall faster and labor falls
less.
Tax Revenues Spent on Public Capital
Next, we compare the following two scenarios; the rst one is the same as before. That
is, the growth path of the economy with a high debt shock. The other one is the growth
path of an economy with a high debt shock and with population growth when the extra
tax revenue is spent productively on public capital stock. In doing this comparison, the
present value of debts,
PV Dt :=
tX
s=0
R s bds; (4.13)
is kept the same between the two scenarios.
The blue line in Figure 4.6 is the model with no population growth (the same as
Figure 4.4), and the red dashed line is the model with population growth and government
investment in public capital using the extra tax revenue. For comparison, the green
lines report the responses under the model with population growth and no government
investment.
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Figure 4.6: Dynamic Responses to Debt Shock. Blue lines: debt shock only; green lines:
population growth; red dashed lines: population growth with government investment
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In the case where there is the presence of government investment, private capital
per capita quickly begins to increase about ten years after the shock and returns to the
steady state. This is because an increase in the marginal product of capital induced by the
accumulation of productive public capital generates an expansion in private investment
and, therefore, capital dilution eects are mitigated. Output and consumption per capita
also converge faster to the steady state due to increases in private and public capital per
capita.
Expected Tax Revenues Spent on Public Capital
We next turn to the case where population growth occurs ten years after the initiating
shock in Figure 4.7. If government invests in public capital, government debts rise more
during the rst ten years due to a rise in aggregate government purchases. After that,
however, the debts begin to decrease more rapidly due to an increase in population,
i.e., the number of taxpayers. Although the resulting dynamic responses of government
debts look dierent from those with no population growth, their present values, which
are calculated using (4.13), are nearly identical.
In this case, capital dilution eects that are supposed to occur ten years later due to
population growth are mitigated by a much larger increase in private investment induced
by the accumulation of productive capital. The increase in public capital and the lower
decrease in private capital are responsible for a much larger increase in output and,
hence, a smoother consumption path. That is, if the expected tax revenues from future
population growth are spent on productive capital, capital dilution eects are mitigated
greatly.
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Figure 4.7: Dynamic Responses to Debt Shock. Blue lines: debt shock only; green lines:
population growth; red dashed lines: population growth with government investment
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Tax Revenues Spent on Private Capital
Next we consider the case where government can invest directly in building up the private
capital stock. Specically, we assume that log-linearized capital accumulation equation
is now given by
bkt+1 =  1  ~
AN
!bkt + ~
AN
bxt + a ~
AN
! bIGt   bAt+1   bNt+1;
where the third term in the right hand side is newly introduced. We assume that gov-
ernment is less ecient in building up private capital than the private sector, and the
parameter a 2 (0; 1) captures this ineciency. That is, the parameter governs eciency
of transformation of government investment into private capital stock.
We set the parameter a equal to 0:9 in the baseline. The red dashed lines in Figure
4.8 reports the dynamic responses for this case. The top right panel in Figure 4.8 shows
that capital dilution eects are not mitigated even ten years after the shock, as opposed
to the case with government investment in public capital in Figure 4.6.
Expected Tax Revenues Spent on Private Capital
Next we change the timing of population growth as before. Figure 4.9 reports for this
case. Unlike the public capital investment case, even if expected tax revenue is spend on
building up private capital, capital dilution eects induced by population growth are not
mitigated.
4.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The results above depend on the parameters we set in Tables 4.2. We therefore conduct
sensitivity tests to examine how dierent parameter values aect the shape of impulse
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Figure 4.8: Dynamic Responses to Debt Shock. Blue lines: debt shock only; green
lines: population growth; red dashed lines: population growth with direct government
investment in private capital
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Figure 4.9: Dynamic Responses to Debt Shock. Blue lines: debt shock only; green lines:
population growth; red dashed lines: delayed population growth with direct government
investment in private capital
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response functions to a debt shock. In particular, we experiment with variations in the
productiveness of public capital G in the case of delayed population growth with public
capital investment, which has led to mitigate capital dilution greatly as we have seen in
Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.10 displays the dynamics for three alternative parameter choices (G =
0:2; 0:1, or 0:05) in the case with population growth and government investment in pub-
lic capital. It is very intuitive that the lower productiveness will lead to higher capital
dilution eects and, therefore, smaller outputs.
Figure 4.10: Alternative choices of G
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper has extended the Uhlig (2010) model to allow for population growth and
public capital in order to analyze the eects of a policy that increases an economy's rate
of population growth in response to an unexpected increase in its debt to GDP ratio.
We nd that there is indeed a potential for such a policy to boost economic activity
without increasing the present value of government debts if the expected tax revenue
from future increased population growth is spent eectively on productive public capital
at the correct time. However, there is also scope for depressing the economy further if the
dilution of the domestic capital stock by increased population is not properly managed.
For example, the direct government investment in private capital or less productive public
capital is not useful in mitigating capital dilution.
Future research would need a quantitative criterion to assess the performances of
immigration policies considered above. Introducing heterogeneity between the natives
and immigrants and calculating immigration surplus accruing to the native populations
on the lines of Ben-Gad (2008) would be an important contribution. We also require
assessment against empirical evidence obtained, for example, from simulating on the lines
of Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) as well as estimating on the lines of An and Schorfheide
(2007).
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Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 Log-linearizing around the Balanced Growth Path
This appendix provides the details of how we derived the rst-order conditions and de-
trended equations. Then we presents the derivations of the log-linearized equations of the
model as well as the steady state relationships.
C.2 Derivations of the First-Order Conditions and Detrended
Equations
C.2.1 Household's Problem
The Lagrangian for household problem is given by
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
Nt
(ct(lt))
1    1
1  
 t((1 +  c)ctNt +
xtNtz }| {
(kt+1Nt+1   (1  )ktNt)+btNt  Rbtbt 1Nt 1   stNt  mtNt
  (1   lt )wtntNt   (rt   k(rt   ))ktNt)
#
:
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Then, the rst-order conditions for ct, lt, kt+1 and bt are;
[ct] : Ntc
 
t ((lt))
1    t(1 +  c)Nt = 0
, t = c
 
t ((lt))
1 
1 +  c
(C.1)
[lt] : Ntc
1 
t ((lt))
 0(lt) + t(1   lt )wtNt = 0
, c1 t ((lt)) 0(lt) + t(1   lt )wt = 0 (C.2)
[kt+1] :   tNt+1 + Et[t+1((1  ) + (rt+1   k(rt+1   )))Nt+1] = 0
, 1 = Et



t+1
t

Rkt+1

(C.3)
[bt] :   tNt + Et
h
t+1R
b
t+1Nt
i
= 0
, 1 = Et



t+1
t

Rbt+1

; (C.4)
where Rkt := (1 )+(rt k(rt )). These expressions are unchanged from the original
Uhlig (2010) model. In order to detrend the variables, we divide by At. Then, equation
(C.1) now becomes:
t =
(ct=At)
 A t ((lt))1 
1 +  c
, et = (ect) ((lt))1 
1 +  c
(C.5)
where t := tA

t . Equation (C.2) is now given by:
(ct=At)
1 ((lt)) 0(lt) + tA

t (1   lt )(wt=At) = 0
, (ect)1 ((lt)) 0(lt) + et(1   lt ) ewt = 0: (C.6)
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Similarly, equation (C.3) and (C.4) are rewritten as:
1 =Et



t+1A

t+1
tA

t

At
At+1

Rt+1

=Et
"

 et+1et
!
At
At+1

Rt+1
#
(C.7)
where Rt+1 = R
b
t+1 = R
k
t+1.
C.2.2 The Balanced Growth Path
Along the balanced growth path of growing consumption (c+1 = 
Ac) and constant labor
(l+1 = l), the asset price equation (C.7) becomes:
1 =

1
A

R
, R = 1
(A) 
=
Ae ; (C.8)
where e := (A)1  and R = Rb = Rk.
C.2.3 Production
The production function is expressed in per capita terms as follows:
yt :=
Yt
Nt
= At
K1 t Lt
N1 t Nt
 
KGt
G
= Atk
1 
t l

t (K
G
t )
G : (C.9)
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Note that KGt is not expressed in per capita terms since we assume that K
G
t is a pure
public good, and therefore, it is not aected by the number of people. The rst-order
condition delivers capital rental rates and wages,
[kt] : (1  )Atk t lt (KGt )G = rt (4.14)
[lt] : A

tk
1 
t l
 1
t (K
G
t )
G = wt (C.10)
C.2.4 Government
The government budget constraint is written as
Dt =Gt + St +R
b
tBt 1    cCt   k(rt   )Kt
=Bt + 
l
twtLt
Dividing both side by Nt gives
dt =gt + st +R
b
tbt 1

1
ht

   cct   k(rt   )kt
=bt + 
l
twtlt
Debt and tax dynamics are
 (Dt  AtNtD) =  ltwtLt  AtNt lwL;
(1   )(Dt  AtNtD) = Bt  AtNtB:
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Dividing both sides of these two equations by Nt gives
 (dt  AtD) =  ltwtlt  At lwL
(1   )(dt  AtD) = bt  AtB:
Aggregate government purchases Gt consists of basic government purchases G
B
t and gov-
ernment investment IGt . That is,
Gt = G
B
t + I
G
t
, gt = gBt + IGt :
since we assume that IGt is not aected by the number of people.
C.2.5 Resource Constraint
Ct +Xt +Gt = Yt +Mt
, ct + xt + gt = yt +mt
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C.3 Derivations of Log-linearized Equations
C.3.1 Labor Supply
Since the rst-oeder conditions for ct and lt are unchanged, the labor supply equation is
also unchanged from the original Uhlig model. In fact, substituting (C.5) into the (C.6),
(ect)1 ((lt)) 0(lt) +
=etz }| {
(ect(lt)) (lt)
1 +  c
(1   lt ) ewt = 0
, ect0(lt) + 1
1 +  c
(lt)(1   lt ) ewt = 0 (C.11)
In the steady state,
c 0(l) +
1
1 +  c
(l)(1   l)w = 0
,  
0(l)l
(l)
=
1   l
1 +  c

y
c
 ;
where we use the steady state relationship of  = wl=y. Taking the rst-order Taylor
expansion of (C.11) around the steady state,
0 =0(l)c
(ect   c)
c
+

c 00(l) +
1   l
1 +  c
0(l)w

l
(lt   l)
l
+
1   l
1 +  c
(l)w
( ewt   w)
w
  w
1 +  c
(l) ( lt   )| {z }
=b lt
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Dividing both sides by 0(l)c,
0 =bct + 00(l)l
0(l)
+
1   l
1 +  c
wl
c| {z }
=
!blt + 1   l
1 +  c
(l)
0(l)
w
c
bwt   1
1 +  c
(l)
0(l)
w
c
b lt
, 0 =bct + 00(l)l
0(l)
+ 

| {z }
=1=!S
blt + 1   l
1 +  c
 (l)0(l)z }| {
 1 + 
c
1   l
c
w
!
w
c
bwt   1
1 +  c
 (l)0(l)z }| {
 1 + 
c
1   l
c
w
!
w
c
b lt
, bwt =bct + 1
!S
blt + 1
1   l b lt
C.3.2 Lagrange Multiplier
Taking the rst-order Taylor expansion of (C.5),
 exp(bt) =   c (l)1 
1 +  c
(ct   c)
c
+ (1  )c
 (l) 0(l)l
1 +  c
(lt   l)
l
, bt =  bct + (1  ) c (l)1 
1 +  c| {z }
=
0(l)l
(n)| {z }
= 
blt
, bt =  bct   (1  )blt;
where we use the steady state relationship of  = c (l)1 =(1 +  c).
C.3.3 Asset Price Equations for the Bond Return and Capital Return
Log-linearizing (C.7) gives:
1 = Et



1
A

R exp(bt+1   bt   bAt+1 + bRt+1)
1 = Et
h
1 + bt+1   bt   bAt+1 + bRt+1i
0 = Et
hbt+1   bt   bAt+1 + bRt+1i :
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C.3.4 Capital Return
Rkt =(1  ) + (rt   k(rt   ))
=(1  ) + (1  k)rt + k (C.12)
In the steady state,
Rk = (1  ) + (1  k)r + k; or
r =
Rk   1 + (1  k)
(1  k) (C.13)
Log-linearizing (C.12) gives
R exp( bRkt ) = (1  ) + (1  k)r exp(brt) + k
, bRkt = (1  k) rRbrt
Substituting (C.13),
bRkt = (1  k)R  1 + (1  k)(1  k)

1
R
brt
=

1  (1  (1  k)) 1
R
brt
Substituting (C.8),
bRkt =
 
1  (1  (1  k))
~

!brt
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C.3.5 Private Capital Accumulation
The derivation of the log-linearized equation for private capital accumulation is the same
as that of Subsection A.2.5 in Appendix A. Therefore,
bkt+1 =  1  ~
AN
!bkt + ~
AN
bxt   bAt+1   bNt+1;
where
~ := AN   1 +  = x=k: (C.14)
C.3.6 Production Function
Divide both sides of (C.9) by At to denote detrended equations,
yt
At
=
Atk
1 
t
AtA
1 
t
lt

KGt
At
G
AGt
, eyt = ek1 t lt ( eKGt )GAGt
, byt = (1  )bkt +  blt + G( bKGt + bAt):
C.3.7 Wage
Divide both sides of (C.10) by At to denote detrended equations,
wt
At
= 
Atk
1 
t
AtA
1 
t
l 1t

KGt
At
G
AGt
, ewt = ek1 t l 1t ( eKGt )GAGt
, bwt = (1  )(bkt   blt) + G( bKGt + bAt):
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C.3.8 Capital Rental Rates
To derive brt, we make use of the fact that the sum of factor earnings exhaust the total
output.
1 =
rtkt
yt
+
wtlt
yt|{z}
=
, 1   =rtkt=At
yt=At
=
ekteyt
, rt =(1  )eytekt
, brt =byt   bkt
C.3.9 Technology Growth
At =
At
At 1
, bAt = bAt   bAt 1
C.3.10 Public Capital Accumulation
Public capital accumulation is expressed as follows:
KGt+1 = (1  )KGt + IGt :
Divide both sides by At to denote detrended equations,
KGt+1
At+1
At+1
At
= (1  )K
G
t
At
+
IGt
At
, eKGt+1At+1 = (1  ) eKGt + eIGt :
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Log-linearizing gives
KGA exp( bKGt+1 + bAt+1) = (1  )KG exp( bKGt ) + IG exp(bIGt )
, A( bKGt+1 + bAt+1) = (1  ) bKGt + IGKG bIGt
, bKGt+1 = 1  A bKGt + ~GA IGt   bAt+1
, =
 
1 
~G
A
! bKGt + ~GA IGt   bAt+1;
where we use the steady state relationship of IG=KG = A   1 +  =: ~G.
C.3.11 Government Budget Constraint
The government budget constraint per capita in terms of detrended variables is:
dt
At
=
gt
At
+
st
At
+Rbt
bt 1
At 1
At 1
At

1
Nt

   c ct
At
  k(rt   ) kt
At
, edt = egt + est +Rbtebt 1 1At Nt

   cect   k(rt   )ekt
Log-linearizing gives:
dbdt = gbgt + sbst + Rbb
AN
( bRbt +bbt 1   bAt   bNt )   ccbct   k(rbrt + (r   )kbkt):
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To denote bdt := (edt   d)=y, bgt := (egt   g)=y, bst := (est   s)=y, and bbt := (ebt   b)=y, we
divide both sides by y,
bdt = bgt + bst + RbbyAN ( bRbt   bAt   bNt ) + RbAN bbt 1    c cybct   k rky rt   k

rk
y
  k
y

bkt
= bgt + bst + beyN ( bRbt   bAt   bNt ) + 1eN bbt 1    c cybct   k(1  )brt   k

1     
~
x
y
bkt
since Rb = A=e, rk=y = 1    by Cobb-Douglas production function, and k=y =
(1=~)(x=y) by (C.14).
C.3.12 Low of Motion of Labor Tax
In terms of detrended variables,
 (dt  AtD) =  ltwtlt  At l wL
,  (edt  D) =  lt ewtlt    l wL
At the steady state,
 (d D) =  lwl    l wL
,  d(1 AN) =  lwl(1 AN)
,  d =  lwl;
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where we use the steady state relationship of D = ANd, w = Aw, and L = lN with A
and N denoting the steady state values of At and Nt respectively. Log-linearizing gives
 (d(1 + bdt) D) =  lwl(1 + b lt + bwt + blt)   lwL
,  dbdt =  lwl(b lt + bwt + blt)
,  bdt =  lwly (b lt + bwt + blt)
, = b lt +  l( bwt + blt);
where we use wl=y = 
C.3.13 Low of Motion of Debt
In terms of detrended variables,
(1   )(dt  AtD) = bt  AtB
, (1   )(edt  D) = ebt  B
At the steady state,
(1   )(d D) = b B
, (1   )d(1 AN) = b(1 AN)
, (1   )d = b;
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where we use the steady state relationship of B = ANb. Log-linearizing gives
(1   )(d(1 + bdt) D) = b(1 +bbt) B:
, (1   )dbdt = bbbt
, (1   )bdt = bbt
C.3.14 Aggregate Government Purchases
egt =egBt + eIG
, g exp(bgt) =gB exp(bgBt ) + IG exp(bIGt )
Dividing by y
g
y
bgt =gB
y
bgBt + IGy bIGt
, bgt =(bgBt ) + IGy bIGt ;
Note that gBt = (egBt   gB)=y.
C.3.15 Resource Constraint
eyt = ect + ext + egt
, y exp(byt) = y exp(bct) + y exp(bxt) + y exp(bgt)
, byt = c
y
bct + x
y
bxt + bgt :
Note that gt = (egt   g)=y.
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C.4 Derivation of a Second-Order Approximation to a Household's Wel-
fare per Capita
The period utility per capita is given by
u(ct; lt) =
(ct(lt))
1    1
1   :
The rst, the second, and the cross derivatives evaluated at a steady state (c; l) are:
uc = c
 (l)1 
ucc =  c  1(l)1 
ul = c
1 (l) 0(l)
ull = c
1 [ (l)  1(0(l))2 +(l) 00(l)]
ucl = (1  )c (l) 0(l):
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For later use, we calculate the following using derivatives above:
ull
ucc
=
c1 (l) 0(l)l
c1 (l)1 
=
0(l)l
(l)
=  
(uccc+ uc)c
ucc
=
uccc
2
ucc
+ 1 =
 c1 (l)1 
c1 (l)1 
+ 1 = 1  
(ulll + ul)l
ucc
=
ulll
2
ucc
+
ull
ucc
=
c1 [ (l)  1(0(l))2 +(lt) 00(l)]l2
c1 (l)1 
  
, =   (
0(l))2l2
(l)2
+
00(l)l2
(l)
  
, =  2 + 
00(l)l
0(l)| {z }
=1=!S 
0(l)l
(l)| {z }
= 
 
, =  2 + 2   
!S
  
, = (1  )2  

1 +
1
!S


uclcl
ucc
=
(1  )c1 (l) 0(l)l
c1 (l)1 
= (1  )
0(l)l
(l)
=  (1  )
The second-order Taylor expansion of ut around a steady state (c; l) yields
ut ' u+ ucc c^t + ull l^t + 1
2
(uccc+ uc)c c^
2
t +
1
2
(ulll + ul)l l^
2
t + uclcn c^t l^t
, ut   u
ucc
= c^t +

ull
ucc

l^t +
1
2

(uccc+ uc)c
ucc

c^2t +
1
2

(ulln+ ul)n
ucc

l^2t +

uclcn
ucc

c^t l^t
= c^t    l^t + 1  
2
c^2t +
1
2

(1  )2  

1 +
1
!S



l^2t   (1  ) c^t l^t
=

c^t +
1  
2
c^2t

  

l^t   1
2

(1  ) 

1 +
1
!S

l^2t

  (1  ) c^t l^t
=

c^t +
1  
2
c^2t

  

l^t +
1
2

(   1)+

1 +
1
!S

l^2t

  (1  ) c^t l^t
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Hence, a second-order approximation to the household's welfare losses can be expressed
as a fraction of steady state consumption:
W = E0
1X
t=0
t

ut   u
ucc

= E0
1X
t=0
t

c^t +
1  
2
c^2t

  

l^t +
'
2
l^2t

  (1  ) c^t l^t

;
where ' := (   1)+

1 + 1!S

. We can calculate this value since we know the path of
c^t and l^t.
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